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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this paper, I study the effects of funding constraints with respect to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
violations, i.e. the excess returns from the traditional carry strategies. More specifically, I examine the 
impact of the realized firm-level idiosyncratic aggregate average uncertainty in the United States (U.S.) 
economy as well as the realized firm-level idiosyncratic average uncertainty in the U.S. financial sector on 
carry trade excess returns. Moreover, I conduct a sub-period analysis with respect to the surge in the amount 
of speculative capital since early 2000 and the financialization in order to understand how sensitive the 
speculative community is to unexpected changes in systemic risk. Finally, in addition to contributing to 
existing research and opening new avenues for future research, I re-examine and confirm existing literature 
on the uncovered interest parity (UIP) violations, the role of learning in the forward premium puzzle, and 
the linkage between currency carry trades and currency crash risk.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data set consists of daily spot and forward rates for 9 currencies with respect to the USD dollar from 
January 1996 to February 2014. In addition, I collect daily data for all listed U.S. stocks and their daily 
returns from CRSP for the same period in order to construct the idiosyncratic firm-level risk metrics. To test 
the hypotheses, I estimate several multivariate OLS regressions with varying specifications and perform 
numerous robustness checks. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The multivariate model based upon the idiosyncratic financial sector uncertainty is statistically significant 
and explains 14.3% of the excess return variability of the High-minus-Low (HML3) portfolios that comprise 
a long position in the top three currencies and a short position in the bottom three currencies. The funding 
model consists of two independent explanatory variables that are both related to the realized idiosyncratic 
average firm-level uncertainty in the U.S. financial sector: a contemporaneous change and a 6-month 
moving average.  
Moreover, a multivariate funding model based upon the conventional TED spread, a typical measure of 
funding constraints, and the idiosyncratic banking sector uncertainty explains 21.4% of the High-minus-Low 
(HML3) excess return variability. The marginal contribution of the latter is statistically significant once I 
take into account the loss in degrees of freedom.  
Additionally, a single explanatory variable which proxies the effects of unexpected funding shocks, a 
normalized specification, explains 11.4% of the High-minus-Low (HML3) excess return variability for the 
full period from 1996 to 2013. In comparison, the contemporaneous TED spread explains 11.0% of the 
variation for the same period. The correlation coefficient among the two is 0.56. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of the normalized specification increases from 11.4% to 22.0% in a multi-dimensional 
setting. 
Keywords:  Foreign Exchange, Forward Premium Puzzle, Carry Trades, Funding Constraints, Idiosyncratic 
Firm-Level Uncertainty 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkin pro gradu-tutkielmassani keskimääräisen yrityskohtaisen riskin vaikututusta valuuttamarkkinoiden 
ylituottoihin. Lasken yrityskohtaisen epävarmuusmittarin Yhdysvaltain osakemarkkinoille sekä erikseen 
Yhdysvaltain rahoitussektorille. Tarkoitukseni on tutkia toteutuneen rahoitusriskin vaikutusta erilaisten 
valuuttastrategioiden ylituottoihin. Lisäksi tutkin eri aikaperiodeita hyödyntäen keinottelijoiden herkkyyttä 
muutoksiin systeemiriskissä. Lopuksi tarkastelen keskimääräisten ylituottojen luonteenomaisia piirteitä 
valuuttamarkkinoilla, tutkin uncovered interest parity (UIP) - teoreettisen kehikon paikkansapitävyyttä 
huomioiden sekä ajan kulun että oppimisen ja perehdyn valuuttamarkkinoiden ylituottojen toteutuneen 
jakauman vinouteen ja sen mahdollisiin aiheuttajiin. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄT 
Otokseni koostuu yhdeksästä valuuttaparista, jotka kaikki noteerataan Yhdysvaltain dollaria vastaan. 
Otokseni pitää sisällään valuuttakurssien ja termiinikurssien päivämuutokset aikaväliltä tammikuu 1996 ja 
joulukuu 2013. Lisäksi osakemarkkinaotokseni pitävät sisällään kaikki Yhdysvalloissa noteeratut julkiset 
yritykset ja heidän päiväkohtaiset osaketiedot samalta aikaperiodilta. Osakekohtaista dataa hyödyntäen 
lasken yrityskohtaiset epävarmuustekijät kuten olen yllä kuvannut. Hypoteeseja tutkiessani rakennan useita 
OLS monimuuttujamenetelmä eri muuttujia hyödyntäen sekä ja varmistan tuloksien tilastollista 
merkitsevyyttä. 
 
TULOKSET 
Rakentamani monimuuttujamenetelmä on tilastollisesti merkitsevä ja selittää 14.3% valuuttamarkkinoiden 
High-minus-Low portfolioiden ylituottojen muutoksista. High-minus-Low portfolio pitää sisällään pitkän 
position korkoerolla mitaten kolmessa kärkivaluutassa ja lyhyen position kolmessa pohjavaluutassa. 
Rahoitusriskiä replikoiva  monimuuttujamenetelmä pitää sisällään kaksi selittävää muuttujaa, joista 
kummatkin liittyvät  Yhdysvaltain rahoitussektorin keskimääräiseen yrityskohtaiseen epävarmuuteen.  
 
Monimuuttujamenetelmä, joka yhdistää olemassa olevan tiedon TED rahoitusriskimuuttujan ja  
Yhdysvaltain rahoitussektorin keskimääräistä yrityskohtaista epävarmuutta mittaavaan 
rahoitusriskimuuttujan kesken, kykenee selittämään 21.4% HML portfolioiden ylikurssimuutoksista.   
 
Lisäksi, yksittäin selittävätekijä, joka mittaa toteutuneen rahoitusriskimuuttujan odottamattoman muutoksen 
suuruutta kykenee selittämään 11.4% ylituottojen vaihtelusta. On myöskin varteenotettavaa, että kyseisen 
muuttajan selitysaste kasvaa monotonisesti 11.4%:sta 22.0%:iin ajan suhteen samanaikaisesti kuin 
keinottelijoiden alla olevien positioiden suuruusluokka kasvaa huomattavasti. 
 
  
Avainsanat:  Valuuttamarkkinat, Epänormaalit ylituotot, Erilaiset valuuttastrategiat, Rahoitusriski, 
Yrityskohtainen epävarmuus 
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A. Introduction 
 
A.1 Background and Motivation 
Over the past few years, the lion’s share of existing research on foreign exchange has been centered 
around three different literatures: the forward premium puzzle, funding constraints, and disaster 
risk. The causality goes from funding constraints and disaster risk to carry trade returns. At the 
same time, the relationship may characterize something called a reverse causality, where an effect 
actually occurs before its cause. More importantly, the topics are seemingly interconnected. 
Therefore, given a traditional carry trade is nothing but a risky variant of future spot rate, the decade 
old remarks of Meese and Rogoff (1982) on randomness are not anymore the pivotal subjects of 
modern research. However, this does not mean that spot exchange rates would not follow a random 
process, but rather that the causes of what appears to be random, are increasingly linked to both the 
funding risk and the disaster risk, especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. 
 
The first subset, the forward premium puzzle, relates to the empirical failure of the uncovered 
interest parity (UIP) that is the classic topic of international finance and the critical building block 
of most theoretical frameworks. Fama (1984) robustly captures the violations of the UIP framework 
and concludes that innovations relate to changes in the risk premia. The author provides future 
research with presumptions for the possible sources of risk premia but does not embark on a 
journey to attribute the UIP violations to any of them. The second subset, the funding constraints, 
attributes these UIP violations to the funding risks such as increases in margin requirements due to 
uncertainty, which in turn has its implications on collateralized funding and speculators’ 
positioning. With respect to the funding constraints and asset prices, the theoretical foundation has 
been laid by Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), as well as Duffie and 
Strulovici (2012). In relation to the forward premium puzzle more specifically, Brunnermeier, 
Nagel and Pedersen (2009) and Filipe and Suominen (2013) link funding constraints to carry trade 
excess returns. The third subset, the disaster risk, relates to Dodrynskaya (2013), who concludes 
that the carry trade crashes occur systematically in the worst states of the world. 
 
A potential limitation of existing studies on funding constraints is highlighted in Adrian and Shin 
(2002), where the authors conclude that the aggregate liquidity can be seen as a rate of change in 
the aggregate balance sheet of financial intermediaries. In other words, changes in financial 
institutions’ equity prices affect their ability to lend. A simple way to measure the aggregate change 
is to compute a measure for the average idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty in the financial industry 
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as in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001, henceforth also CLMX). This is contrary to Filipe 
and Suominen (2013), who proxy the funding constraints using the implied stock market volatility, 
rather than the realized industry-specific volatility, in measuring the uncertainty with reference to 
funding constraints. Similarly, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009) identify states where 
speculators are forced to unwind positions using the CBOE VIX option implied volatility (VIX) and 
the TED spread. None of these studies however, measure directly the volatility of common stocks 
within the financial sector as proposed by Adrian and Shin (2002). 
 
A.2 Objective and Contribution 
In order to contribute to existing research, I construct two proxies for the funding risk that relate to 
the realized idiosyncratic firm-level aggregate average uncertainty in the United States (U.S.) 
economy as well as the realized idiosyncratic firm-level average uncertainty in the U.S. financial 
sector. In other words, both measures are a function of changes in equity prices over the period. 
Additionally, I derive two specifications for these funding proxies: a directional downside adjusted 
measure and a normalized measure. I argue that a direction is more important than dispersion, a 
rationale for the directional specification, and that anything that is unexpected must relate to a 
surprise, a rationale for the normalized specification. I expect that the first specification relates 
more to the funding constraints while the second may better proxy the disaster risk. Also, I 
construct a multivariate funding model that contains the joint explanatory effect of the funding 
proxies documented in Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009) together with the ones 
documented in this paper. 
 
Furthermore, given the findings of Ang et. al. (2006 and 2009) in relation to the idiosyncratic 
volatility emerging from the U.S. and its ability to explain the cross-section of stock returns both in-
sample and out-of-sample studies, locally and globally, raises a question related to the role of 
uncertainty emerging from the United States (US) as part of the forward premium puzzle. The early 
evidence of idiosyncratic volatility in foreign exchange is present in Guo and Savickas (2006) but is 
not exhaustive. 
 
In conclusion, the objective is to contribute to existing research and potentially open new avenues 
for future research. Also, I re-examine existing literature on the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
violations, the role of learning in the forward premium puzzle, and the linkage between currency 
carry trades and currency crash risk. 
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A.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The results of this paper are subject to the stale price bias given the fact that the empirical analysis 
on carry returns deploys the end-of-month (EOM) data on foreign exchange rates. However, given 
the fact that my data only includes currencies that are conceptually similar in terms of liquidity and 
foreign exchange regime, I believe that I have greatly mitigated this issue. 
 
Additionally, I only proxy the uncertainty emerging from the United States though the USD dollar 
is not by definition a typical funding currency as part of the HML strategies in foreign exchange. 
Therefore, in addition to traditional High-minus-Low (HML) portfolios that consist of simultaneous 
long and short positions and are therefore USD funding neutral, I construct long only portfolios that 
are being funded via USD money markets. 
 
Finally, my results assume that covered interest parity (CIP) holds as documented in Akram et. al. 
(2008). 
 
A.4 Main Findings 
The multivariate model based upon the idiosyncratic financial sector uncertainty is statistically 
significant and explains 14.3% of the excess return variability of the High-minus-Low (HML3) 
portfolios that comprise a long position in the top three currencies and a short position in the bottom 
three currencies. The funding model consists of two independent explanatory variables that are both 
related to the realized idiosyncratic average firm-level uncertainty in the U.S. financial sector: a 
contemporaneous change and a 6-month moving average.  
 
Moreover, a multivariate funding model based upon the conventional TED spread, a typical 
measure of funding constraints, and the idiosyncratic banking sector uncertainty explains 21.4% of 
the High-minus-Low (HML3) excess return variability. The marginal contribution of the latter is 
statistically significant once I take into account the loss in degrees of freedom.  
 
Additionally, a single explanatory variable which proxies the effects of unexpected funding shocks, 
a normalized specification, explains 11.4% of the High-minus-Low (HML3) excess return 
variability for the full period from 1996 to 2013. In comparison, the contemporaneous TED spread 
explains 11.0% of the variation for the same period. The correlation coefficient among the two is 
0.56. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the normalized specification increases from 11.4% to 
22.0% in a multi-dimensional setting. 
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A.5 Structure of the Study 
This paper is structured as follows: Section B examines existing literature on the forward premium 
puzzle, funding constraints, disaster risk, and the role of the U.S. in asset pricing. Section C 
presents the data, carry trade ranking methodologies, and different carry portfolios. Section D 
presents the independent explanatory variables of this paper. Section E is a summary of my 
empirical findings and finally, section F summarises my findings. 
 
B. Literature Review 
 
B.1 Covered and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
Every literature review subsumes a causal and logical structure connecting the related topics that 
are centered around one or more focal points. The focal point of this paper is the forward premium 
puzzle, which is one of the most robust findings of existing literature of international finance, 
showing that the forward exchange rate does not predict the subsequent, realized exchange rate 
change (Fama, 1984 among others). This is an undisputed fact of past and present. The pivotal 
causes of these violations relate to the crash risk (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2009) and 
the funding constraints (Filipe and Suominen, 2013). In order to look in more detail these pivotal 
causes, a basic understanding of covered interest parity (CIP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP) is 
required. It is important to fully understand these two related frameworks and their underpinning 
assumptions before embarking on any endeavors attempting to solve the forward premium puzzle, 
as the puzzle effectively violates these frameworks. 
 
To start with, a simple theoretical framework that intuitively explains the relationship between 
interest rate on an asset denominated in one country’s currency unit, interest rate on a similar asset 
while denominated in another country’s currency unit, and the expected future spot exchange rate 
between the two countries is required. In other words, a model that explains the structural rationale 
under which today’s price of foreign exchange deliverable on a specific future date is determined is 
detrimental. Most academics agree that if investors are risk neutral and hold rational expectations, 
the market’s forecast of future exchange rate is implicit in differences in interest rates (Froot and 
Thaler, 1990). 
 
The covered interest parity (CIP) is the simplest model for open economies that leans on the no-
arbitrage combined with rational expectations. CIP simply assumes that exchange rates are market 
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determined, all available information is present, and that investors are rational. CIP is also known as 
the weak version of frictionless capital mobility (Eaton and Turnovsky, 1983). Under the 
framework bonds are risk-free both domestically and abroad and because the model assumes no-
arbitrage combined with rational expectations, market participants ought to bring the domestic 
interest rate (R) into equality with the foreign interest rate (R’) plus the forward premium or 
discount of foreign exchange (F) (Eaton and Turnovsky, 1983). In other words, returns on 1-month 
money market instrument in the U.S. and in the UK are on average equalized. Therefore, the 
covered interest parity (CIP) can be written as: 
 1 + 𝑅! = (1 + 𝑅′!) ∗ 𝑆!  /  𝐹! ,                                                                                                                                      (1) 
 
where 𝑅  , R’, and F are defined over the same maturity. The key to understanding CIP is that the 1-
month money market instruments in question are effectively perfect substitutes aside from the 
currency of denomination. In other words, formula (1) assumes that investors’ net returns on 
investments that borrow domestically and lend abroad in similar interest bearing assets are zero 
when the exchange rate uncertainty is hedged with a foreign exchange forward contract. 
 
Generally speaking, the law of one price (LOP) requires that similar securities have a single price. 
If the price is defined as yield, CIP postulates that two similar securities that are denominated in 
different currencies must yield exactly the same return when the exchange rate uncertainty is 
removed. Therefore, systematic deviations from the condition (1) would not only refute LOP but 
also leave us to conclude that the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) does not hold.  
 
A slightly more stringent framework derived from CIP adds an additional requirement towards the 
forward premium of foreign exchange forward contract. This requirement relates to the risk 
neutrality, either because there is a sufficient number of risk-neutral speculators providing liquidity, 
or because foreign exchange rate risk is perfectly diversifiable (Eaton and Turnovsky, 1983). 
Therefore, the stronger definition brings the forward premium (discount) on foreign exchange into 
equality with the expected rate of depreciation (appreciation) of the foreign currency: 
 𝐹! = 𝐸! 𝑆!!!   /  𝑆! ,                                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where S denotes the price of one unit of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency. 
Substituting (2) into (1) yields: 
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 1 + 𝑅! = (1 + 𝑅′!) ∗ 𝑆!  /  𝐸! 𝑆!!! ,                                                                                          (3) 
 
which is also known as the uncovered interest parity (UIP). In other words, UIP requires that 
conditions (1) and (2) hold. Above, 𝐸!(  ) represent the mathematical expectation conditional on 
information available to the market participants at time t (Engel, 1995). In conclusion, CIP assumes 
perfect capital mobility, and UIP requires CIP to hold in conjunction with the risk neutrality. 
 
B.2 Forward Premium Puzzle 
Mussa (1979) reports that interest differential in favor of domestic currency bonds is equal 
approximately to the expected rate of depreciation of domestic money in terms of foreign currency, 
which is in line with condition (1). By the same token, Akram et. al. (2008) investigate more 
recently condition (1) with three exchange rates and conclude that a typical researcher can safely 
assume frictionless capital mobility in foreign exchange markets when working with daily or lower 
frequency of data. The authors observe only short-lived, however economically significant, 
arbitrage opportunities and reason that the result suggest that markets exploit arbitrage opportunities 
rapidly. These two findings conclude that the difference between two interest rates can be 
approximated by the forward premium of foreign exchange:  𝐹!𝑆! = 1 + 𝑅!1 + 𝑅!!                                                                                                                                     (4) 
 
The CIP violations reported by Akram et. al. (2008) do not refute condition (1), and more 
importantly LOP and EMH, because in general terms, the price action requires a catalyst. In other 
words, markets are likely to diverge from the no-arbitrage equilibrium for a split-second when 
something changes investors and traders’ expectations. In order to change someone’s expectations, 
the information must be unexpected. If the information is unexpected, it must not have been priced 
in. Therefore, if the subsequent divergence of the equilibrium is only short-lived, it points towards 
markets actively seeking out opportunities to exploit. In the absence of such an efficient arbitrage 
vacuum, or more generally in the absence of arbitrage opportunities per se, capital could actually 
become binding and lead to CIP, LOP, and EMH breaking down. Therefore, the evidence of only 
short-lived violations of CIP may relate to the fact that capital is fully mobile and that market 
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participants constantly seek arbitrage opportunities and consequently, condition (1) most hold, 
resulting in the resolution of the arbitrage paradox 1. 
 
Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984) on the other hand report systematic deviations from the condition 
(2) among several exchange rates, refuting UIP. Therefore, the forward premium is not a good 
proxy for the realized rate of change of spot exchange rate. If the forward exchange rate is not a 
good proxy for the subsequent change, risk based explanations for these empirically observed 
violations may solve the puzzle. If one or more risk factors would fully explain the violations, the 
results of Hodrick and Fama would refute the assumption of risk neutrality, while holding on 
rational expectations. If there is no possibility to attribute any part of the forward bias to foreign 
exchange risk premium, a failure to save the rational expectations would ensue. However, it is vital 
to understand that expectations can turn out to be incorrect under rational expectations, but they 
cannot systematically deviate from the realized future values as reported Hodrick (1980) and Fama 
(1984).  
 
Generally speaking, the violations of UIP are hard to prove false. Mussa (1979) suggest that while 
the forward premium may usually be regarded as the reasonable measure of the expected spot rate 
change, there is some reason to believe that the forward rates may sometimes diverge from the 
expected future spot rates. Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) say that risk aversion among rational, fully 
informed speculators will create a risk premium, thereby causing condition (2) to break down. Both 
aforementioned presumptions attribute the forward bias to the exchange rate risk premium and 
indirectly refute UIP’s assumption on risk neutrality. Fama (1984) reports that the realized future 
change in spot exchange rate is often less than the expected change observed from the forward 
exchange rate, supporting the risk aversion arguments. In other words, speculators seem to require a 
certain form of compensation to provide liquidity in the foreign exchange forward universe.  
 
Fama (1984) decomposes the forward premium into the expected future spot rate change and the 
risk premia, 𝐹! = 𝐸(𝑆!!!  /  𝑆),+𝑃!, and reports that the most variation in forward premium, 𝐹!, is 
the variation in risk premia, 𝑃!. This confirms the proposition of Mussa (1979) and helps us to 
better understand the cause and effect dynamics behind the theoretical framework. Root and Thaler 
(1990) conclude that foreign exchange markets are risk averse and that exchange risk is unlikely 
fully diversifiable. In conclusion, the forward premium as a pure estimate of the expected change in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	  discussed	  in	  Grossman	  and	  Stiglitz,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  noise	  in	  the	  market,	  prices	  convey	  all	  information,	  and	  therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  incentive	  to	  purchase	  or	  acquire	  information.	  Hence,	  the	  only	  possible	  equilibrium	  is	  one	  with	  no	  information.	  However,	  if	  everyone	  in	  uninformed,	  it	  clearly	  pays	  someone	  to	  become	  informed.	  (Grossman	  and	  Stiglitz,	  1980)	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future spot exchange rate is counterintuitive, but rather a sum of expected change and risk premia 
should be considered.  
 
To the contrary, Mussa (1979) notes that the forward exchange rate is a function of all available 
information at hand at any given moment in time. As a consequence, the forward rate cannot 
subsume any unexpected ‘new information’ that arbitrarily emerges in future. If this new 
information is price sensitive, the predictions will be revisited. Therefore, if something alters 
market’s expectations regarding the forward exchange rate, the current spot exchange rate should 
adjust by approximately the same amount or otherwise the expected return on foreign exchange as 
measured in the form of forward premium would become very large and induce the majority of 
investors to reallocate their wealth into foreign money (Mussa, 1979). This linkage between 
movements in spot exchange rates and contemporaneous movements in forward exchange rates is a 
well-documented, empirical regularity of 1970s (Mussa, 1979). If these information shocks in 
foreign exchange are regularly irregular as well as unexpected, the basis for risk neutrality is 
difficult to accept. 
 
In summary, Mussa (1979), Eaton and Turnovsky (1983), Fama (1984), Root and Thaler (1990), 
and Engel (1995) credibly challenge the fundamental assumption of the UIP, namely the risk 
neutrality, and suggest that the forward premium is more likely a sum of an expected change in 
future spot exchange rate emerging from rational expectations and a time-varying risk premia. 
Engel (1995) holds on rational expectations saying that future task is to attempt to attribute the 
forward rate bias to a foreign exchange risk premium. However, if the rational expectations are let 
go, peso problems may be able to explain the forward premium bias. 
 
B.3 Forward Puzzle Bias Hypothesis 
The forward premium bias is usually tested by regressing the change in the exchange rate on the 
interest differential (Kenneth and Thaler, 1990). Another specification replaces the interest 
differential by the percentage difference between the current spot forward and spot exchange rates 
as in Fama (1984). I prefer the latter specification for its convenience and reiterate the findings of 
Akram et. al. (2008), concluding that CIP holds in practice. As follows 
 ∆𝑆!!!   =   𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑓!!!  𝑠!   − 1 + 𝜂!!! ,                                                                                        (5) 
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where 𝑠!    is the spot price of domestic currency at time 𝑡,     𝑓!   is the one period forward exchange rate 
at time 𝑡,     𝜂! is the regression error and 𝑘    is the maturity. In testing the condition (4), it is common 
to impose rational expectation leading to the conclusion that ∆𝑆!!!    is equivalent to the 
mathematical expectation of change in the foreign exchange conditional on all information at time t 
(Engel, 1995). Under the null hypothesis in (4), the change in spot exchange rate is not related to 
the forward premium. As noted in Kenneth and Thaler (1990), a very large literature has tested the 
condition (4) and the average beta coefficient is reported to come out approximately at -0.88. Engel 
(1995) confirms these results. In conclusion, these findings refute the uncovered interest parity and 
confirm that the empirical regularity is that the coefficient 𝛽 is reliably less than one. 
 
In general, the conclusion is that forward premium is related to changes in the risk premia because a 
finding of 𝛽 < 1 implies that a 1 percent increase in the interest rate differential is associated with 
less than 1 percent depreciation in the base currency value. To the contrary, a finding of β < 0 is 
fundamentally erroneous because an increase in the interest rate differential is associated with 
expected appreciation in the base currency value, resulting in larger change in risk premia. 
Therefore, the real problem of past and present is to explain why a change in interest rate 
differential ought to produce even larger change in the risk premia. Plausible explanations 
addressing this problem fall into two camps depending on our preference regarding rational 
expectations. If we assume rational expectations, plausible explanations are crash risk and funding 
constraints. If we refute rational expectations, plausible explanations are the ’peso problems’, 
learning, irrational expectations, and bandwagon effect (Engel 1995). 
 
B.4 Carry Trades, Funding Risk, and Disaster Risk Premia 
Existing literature on funding constraints with respect to asset prices is supported in the theoretical 
research of Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Duffie and 
Strulovici (2012). Gromb and Vayanos (2002) theorize saying financial constraints limit 
arbitrageurs’ positions as a function of wealth because arbitrageurs need to collateralize their 
positions in each asset separately. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model, where 
margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually supportive, 
leading to liquidity spirals and loss spirals. Duffie and Strulovici (2012) introduce a model which 
states that with unexpected capital shocks, risk premia adjust severely, and then revert somewhat 
over time as capital is redeployed. Therefore, the tenet of these studies is that arbitrageur activity 
benefits all investors up to a point where liquidity suddenly dries up and leads to deleveraging. 
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Related to currency markets, Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009, henceforth also BNP), and 
Filipe and Suominen (2013) link speculators’ funding constraints to carry trade returns. Each study 
reports, implicitly or explicitly, that sudden exchange rate moves are related to unwinding of carry 
trades rather than fundamental news announcements. In other words, speculators tend to unwind or 
deleverage when funding risks loom large ahead.  
 
Further, BNP show that currency crashes are positively correlated with implied stock market 
volatility (VIX) and the TED spread, an indicator for the funding liquidity. In summary, BNP 
results demonstrate that macroeconomic fundamentals determine long-run currency levels and that 
which currencies have high or low interest rates, whereas illiquidity and capital mobility lead to 
short-run currency noise, deviations from the long-run equilibrium, and occasional currency 
crashes.  
 
Filipe and Suominen (2013) measure the carry trade funding risk using stock market volatility and 
crash risk in Japan, which is the main funding currency in foreign exchange thanks to the lost 
decade. The authors chose Japan because the JPY has been the main funding currency, owing to the 
lost decade of deflation. Interestingly, the authors’ model is able to explain 42% of the monthly 
currency carry trade returns. The volatility measure deployed in Filipe and Suominen’s model 
(2013) utilizes data on the option implied volatility for the entire Japanese stock market instead of 
the financial sector alone, due to in sufficient data. Therefore, a potential limitation of this study is 
related to the averaging across bias, which an important difference as reflected in CLMX where the 
authors show that the properties of industry-level volatility vary considerably among industries. 
Furthermore, there is very little reason to believe that industry and market volatility measures 
behave in the same way unless a certain industry, due to its scale, is effectively the whole market. In 
conclusion, an endeavor where the objective is to proxy the funding risk surfacing from the banking 
sector ought to utilize the implied option volatility data on the industry itself, and if not available, 
rely on the realized option volatility. 
 
Similarly, Poti and Siddique (2013) conclude in their final remarks that the risk-capital availability 
predicts the time-varying excess predictability, which is line with the aforementioned. 
 
To the contrary, Farhi et. al. (2013) link the sudden currency crashes to the disaster risk and 
conclude that one-third of the currency risk premia related to the disaster risk premia in advanced 
economies over the period of 1996 to 2011. The authors highlight the importance of disaster risk 
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premia, especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, given the emergence of option 
smiles that are clearly asymmetric. Actually, over the post crisis period, the disaster risk premia 
accounts for more than 50 percentage points of the total currency risk compensation (Farhi et. al., 
2013). The conclusion is that the disaster risk premia is evident in the currency markets and requires 
more attention. However, the disaster risk is not a cause but rather an effect. Therefore, the funding 
literature seems more plausible explanation to UIP violations, because increases in funding risk 
may lead to disasters and subsequent increases in disaster risk premia due to naïve extrapolation.  
 
In conclusion, existing research relates to three different literatures: the forward premium puzzle, 
funding constraints, and disaster risk. Generally speaking, the funding constraints relate to 
Bernanke (1983), confirming that the cost of credit intermediation increases during the crisis on the 
back of broad deterioration of respective balance sheets, which directly impacts the extension of 
credit on behalf of the banks. Therefore, in the modern financial markets, speculators are not as able 
to secure funding to undertake speculative investments. Similarly, Adrian and Shin (2002) conclude 
that aggregate liquidity can be seen as a rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the 
financial intermediaries. In other words, changes in financial institutions equity prices affect their 
ability to lend and therefore, we should consider measuring the idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty 
in the banking sector in order to grasp the full effect of funding constraints on asset prices. On 
another note, disaster risk as in Farhi et. al. (2013) is most likely in some occasions related to 
funding constraints but can be caused by the group behavior due to homogenous positioning as 
well. Either or, both sources of uncertainty are most likely mutually reinforcing. 
 
B.5 Role of United States in the Forward Premium Puzzle 
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) introduce a disaggregated approach to study the volatility 
of common stocks at the market, industry, and firm levels. CLMX findings clearly show an increase 
in the firm-level volatility related to the market volatility. The authors’ findings essentially reveal 
strong evidence pointing towards a positive deterministic trend in the firm-level volatility. Brandt 
et. al. (2008) subsequently document that the surge in the idiosyncratic volatility have completely 
revised and conclude that it is not a trend but rather a temporary phenomena. 
 
The subsequent research, most interestingly Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, henceforth also 
AHXZ), has documented with U.S. data that recent past high idiosyncratic volatility coincides with 
low average stocks returns, vice versa. It other words, the authors reveal a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between the idiosyncratic volatility and the stock-returns. AHXZ (2009) show 
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that the relationship exists also in international framework. Stated differently, by sorting stocks 
across 23 countries on past idiosyncratic volatility, the differences in monthly excess returns after 
adjusting for market, size and book-to-market factors between the highest and the lowest quintile of 
the idiosyncratic stocks is on average negative 1.31%. Because these results are out-of-the-sample 
relative to the earlier U.S. findings (AHXZ 2006), the results of AHXZ (2009) indicate that the 
correlation between the high idiosyncratic volatility and the low stock returns is not just a sample or 
country-specific effect, but rather persistent global phenomena. In other words, AHXZ (2009) show 
that the idiosyncratic volatility effect is simply captured by the U.S. idiosyncratic volatility factor. 
In summary, low returns earned by stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility around the world 
comove largely with the idiosyncratic volatility emerging from the U.S. The authors demonstrate 
that after controlling for the U.S. portfolios comprising long high idiosyncratic volatility stocks and 
short low idiosyncratic volatility stocks, the excess returns of the long-short portfolios positioned in 
international markets are insignificant.  
 
Since the idiosyncratic volatility emerging from the U.S. explains the cross-section of stock returns 
both in-sample and out-of-sample studies (AHXZ 2006, AHXZ 2009), it may explain the cyclical 
variation of the currency excess returns as well. Guo and Savickas (2006) examine the relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and foreign exchange rates. The main results find early evidence 
pointing towards the fact that relatively high level of the U.S. industry-level or firm-level 
idiosyncratic volatility is usually associated with future depreciation in the U.S. dollar. The authors 
are of the opinion that financial variables, such as the idiosyncratic volatility, ought to provide a 
good measure of broad business conditions and therefore, should be less vulnerable to the omitted-
variable bias. Additionally, Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2014, henceforth also RSZ) more recently 
conclude that the lagged U.S. returns significantly predict returns in numerous non-U.S. 
industrialized countries, whilst at the same time they display limited ability to predict U.S. returns 
per se. In summary, the results indicate that U.S. return shocks have statistically and economically 
significant effects on non-U.S. returns. 
 
CLMX (2001), AHXZ (2006, 2009), Guo and Savickas (2006), and more recently RZS (2014) call 
explicitly for a model that incorporates the role of the United States in predicting the expected 
returns of foreign exchange. My objective is to confirm the findings of Guo and Savickas (2006) 
and subsequently extend existing research idiosyncratic volatility. A potential limitation of Guo and 
Savickas (2006) is that they fail to investigate this relationship on a monthly basis and therefore, the 
results may relate to unintentional proxies due to a common time trend, which are especially 
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common in time series analysis. For instance you think that Y depends upon Z, while in reality it 
depends upon X. 
 
C. Data, Ranking Methodologies, and Carry Permutations 
 
C.1 Data 
In my analysis, I scrutinize the foreign exchange carry trades on a currency by currency and on a 
portfolio basis. I collect daily closing spot exchange rates as well as one-month and three-month 
outright exchange rates with respect to the U.S. dollar from Reuters. The data set consists of 10 
countries: Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Euro Area (EUR), Japan (JPY), New Zealand (NZD), 
Norway (NOK), Poland (PLN), Sweden (SEK), Switzerland (CHF), and United Kingdom (GBP). 
The rationale behind the data composition is based on my desire to omit currencies that are not fully 
convertible and most likely illiquid or less liquid. The daily observations form the raw data series, 
used to calculate standard deviations, semi-deviations, and variance ratios. The empirical analysis 
on carry returns deploys the end-of-month (EOM) data on exchange rates from January 1996 to 
February 2014. The EOM data is non-sample varying in terms of currency composition, which 
means that all pairs are representative for each data point. Also, I have not constructed developed 
and developing markets subsamples because the currencies listed above are similar conceptually: 
liquidity, foreign exchange regime, and monetary framework. Finally, the currencies listed above 
are less likely to suffer from the stale price bias, which refers to a situation where the end-of-month 
(EOM) closing quotes are available, but have not been traded in size. 
 
I also collect daily stock returns, stock prices, number of shares outstanding, and Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes for all shares quoted on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The daily stock 
data is from January 1996 to December 2013. The daily stock return data is used to compute 
different metrics for the firm-level idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty. I use the U.S. 3-month 
Treasury bill rates as a proxy for the risk free rate. 
 
C.2 Introduction to Carry Trade Returns and Return Decomposition 
As mentioned earlier, carry trade performance is measured against the U.S. dollar. In general, the 
exchange rate is defined as a fraction of foreign currency units (FCU) per unit of U.S. dollars. In 
other words, the rate tells the reader the fraction of FCU 1 USD can buy upon conversion at any 
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point in time. I express interchangeably the U.S. dollar as base currency and the FCU in question as 
term currency. Additionally, a positive interest rate differential relates to a forward premium 
because I am able to enter into an agreement where I sell the USD at a higher rate in future as 
compared to the current spot price. Logically, a negative interest rate differential relates to a 
forward discount. 
 
Paving the way for interpretation of the results, it is important to highlight that a positive change in 
spot exchange rate means that the base currency has appreciated versus the term currency. In other 
words, one unit of U.S. dollars is now worth a greater fraction of foreign currency in question. To 
avoid any confusion moving forward, I suggest the reader positions herself or himself as a U.S. 
based investor to whom the U.S. dollar is the functional currency.  
 
Putting transaction cost aside, I define the currency excess returns (rx) as ex post deviations from 
the uncovered interest parity (UIP): 
 𝑟𝑥!!!   = (1 + 𝑖!!"#$) 𝑆!   𝑆!!!   − 1 + 𝑖!!"#$ ,                                                                                                        (6) 
 
where 𝑟𝑥!!!    represents the excess returns earned at time 𝑡 + 1. The drivers of excess returns are the 
interest rate denominated in foreign currency, 𝑖!!"#$,  the interest rate denominated in domestic 
currency, 𝑖!!"#$, and the current spot rate as well as the realized future spot rate for periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, respectively. In other words, a long carry trade is a risky variant of the covered interest parity 
where the investor elects not to purchase the foreign exchange forward contract with a view that the 
USD will not appreciate enough to eliminate the entire profit, the forward premium (Caballero and 
Doyle, 2012). If the investor would enter into the forward agreement, the only source of 
uncertainty, which is effectively future spot rate, would be eliminated. Now, since CIP holds 
closely in the data at daily and lower frequency as in Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008), I re-arrange 
the covered interest parity (CIP) relationship and moving forward write the interest rate differential 
as 1+ 𝑖!!"#$/  1+ 𝑖!!"#$ = 𝑓!  /  𝑠!   . Therefore, from now onwards, I focus on a simple version of the 
carry trade where returns are measured in USD: 
 𝑟𝑥!!!   = 𝑓!   − 𝑠!!!  𝑠!!!                                                                                                                                           (7) 
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I decompose excess returns into the forward and spot components to better understand the 
underlying return dynamics. A forward component is the forward premium or discount agreed at 
the beginning of the period and a spot component is the change in spot exchange rate during the 
period: 
 𝑟𝑥!!!   = 𝑓!   − 𝑠!  𝑠!!!   − 𝑠!!!   − 𝑠!  𝑠!!!   = [𝑓!   − 𝑠!   ] − [𝑠!!!   − 𝑠!   ]𝑠!!!   = 𝑓!   − 𝑠!   − 𝑠!!!   + 𝑠!  𝑠!!!   =     𝑓!   − 𝑠!!!  𝑠!!!                 (8) 
 
Expressed intuitively, in a long carry position initiated at time 𝑡, an investor agrees to sell one unit 
of U.S. dollars at a premium for a future delivery and convert any payout in FCU at maturity using 
the current spot market rate. If the realized change of the spot rate in the interim, 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1 , is less 
than the forward premium, the investor has effectively earned a positive return. It is important to 
remember that carry returns are linear when the payout is plotted in the term currency but are not 
linear when measured in terms of the base currency. This explains the rationale for normalizing the 
returns at maturity with the current spot rate as in (7).  
 
In conclusion, returns are reported in the USD and monthly returns are annualized: I simply 
multiple the mean of the monthly returns by 12 and the standard deviation by 12. I also refer to 
semi-deviation, which is similar to standard deviation but only contains observations where the 
USD has appreciated, i.e. a measure of the downside risk in carry investing. Sharpe and Sortino 
ratios are defined as the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized standard and semi-deviation, 
respectively. 
 
C.3 Portfolio Strategies 
I look at three different portfolio strategies, which I run on a monthly-basis. These strategies are 
conventional among practitioners with each resulting in different expected returns. I refer to these 
portfolio strategies collectively as carry permutations. Each ranking methodology utilizes time 𝑡 
information to rank currencies for the subsequent period. All carry permutations rely on the out-of-
sample excess-return-predictability, which means that the current rankings are expected to produce 
good and reliable predictions of future, expected returns. The reason to follow such a simple and 
naïve strategy bows to the refutation of the UIP. As reflected upon Burnside (2011), the simple idea 
of sorting currencies based on the forward premium is to produce portfolios with different expected 
returns. If the basis of the forward premiums works, the order of expected returns ought to align 
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with an observed return characteristic (Burnside, 2011). Henceforth, I examine the following carry 
permutations: standard carry, forward carry, and normalized carry. 
 
The standard and forward carry strategies rank the currencies on the basis of the absolute interest 
rate differentials. The sharp distinction between the standard carry and forward carry is the 
underlying tenor. In other words, the strategies are based on maturities which have different lengths. 
The standard carry is based on the current interest rate differential derived from the spot and 1-
month forward rates while the forward carry looks at the forward starting interest rate differential 
that is a function of 1-month and 3-month forward rates. Given the information used to rank the 
currencies is based on different parts of the relative term structure; each of the strategies may 
subsume different information and therefore, produce different expected returns and observed 
return characteristics. 
 
The normalized carry is similar to the standard carry with one distinction, the interest rate 
differential is normalized by the three-month realized spot volatility. In other words, the normalized 
carry permutation is looking at the risk-adjusted differentials and is a slightly less conservative 
carry strategy than the permutations, which maximize the absolute differentials without penalizing 
for volatility. 
 
Therefore, the notion for each carry permutation is: 
 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦)! = 𝑓!!!𝑠! − 1                                                                                                                (9) 
 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦)! = 𝑓!!! − 𝑓!!!𝑠! − 1                                                                                                  (10) 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦)! = 𝑓!!!𝑠! − 1 𝜎!!!! ,                                                                                                (11) 
 
where 𝑓!!! is the one-month forward rate, 𝑓!!! is the three-month forward rate, 𝑠! is the current spot 
rate, and 𝜎!!!! is the three-month realized daily volatility. 
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C.4 Carry Portfolios 
When carry portfolios are formed based on a given ranking methodology, I construct two sets of 
portfolios: long portfolios and long-sort portfolios. For the long portfolios, I sort all currencies into 
three bins according to the ranking methodology. The first bin (S1) contains the top three 
currencies, the second bin (S2) contains the middle three currencies, and the third bin (S3) consists 
of the bottom three currencies. This procedure produces three currency portfolios for each carry 
permutation. In other words, portfolios S1, S2, and S3 borrow one dollar and invest it equally in the 
respective elements. This is the equivalent of calculating the average excess return among the three 
currencies in question. For the long-short portfolios I apply the conventional high-minus-low 
procedure, where I borrow in the low premium currency(ies) in order to lend in the high premium 
currency(ies). I consider two different long-short portfolios. The first borrows in the bottom 
currency and lends in the top currency, and the second, while expected to benefit from 
diversification, borrows in S3 and lends in S1: these strategies are referred to HML1 and HML3, 
respectively. It is noteworthy to highligh that the long-short portfolio is dollar-neutral as the dollar 
components cancel out when taking the difference between the long and short positions. However, 
this is not the case with long portfolios S1, S2, and S3 because they are reliant on the USD funding. 
Transaction cost aside, the long and long-sort portfolios are zero-cost strategies, and therefore, do 
not incur any costs at inception. 
 
D. Explanatory Factors 
 
The major avenue of existing research trying to solve the forward premium puzzle concentrates on 
the risk-based explanation and aims to attribute the excess returns to different time-varying risk 
factors. In this section, I introduce two new risk-based explanatory variables that will be used to 
explain the excess returns from different carry trade portfolios, as well as more traditional ones. 
 
D.1 Currency Volatility Factor 
Menkhoff et. al. (2011) examine the relationship between the global foreign exchange volatility 
risk, the currency volatility factor, and the cross-section of carry trade excess returns. Their 
conclusion is that returns from the high forward premium currencies are negatively related to the 
global FX volatility, and therefore, deliver low returns in times when the realized volatility goes up, 
while the low forward premium currencies provide a hedge by yielding positive returns. Burnside 
(2011) re-examines the results of Menkhoff et. al. (2011) and concludes that the VOL factor betas, 
VOL is the monthly average standard deviation of the daily log changes in the values of the 
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currencies against the USD, decrease monotonically with a move from the high forward premium 
portfolios towards the low forward premium portfolios. Burnside (2011) shows that the betas are 
statistically significant for the extreme portfolios, portfolios S1 and S5 in his study, and that the 
beta for the top premium portfolio is positive while the beta for the bottom premium is negative. 
Burnside’s (2011) findings are counterintuitive in the sense that they document an increase in the 
performance of portfolio S1 when the currency volatility factor goes up, whereas for the other 
portfolios, namely S2, S3, S4, S5, the relationship is negative. The difference in Menkhoff et. al. 
(2011) and Burnside (2011) may emerge from the sample selection, as the former has a sample of 
29 currencies against the USD while the latter only has 11. 
  
I define the VOL factor as the monthly average standard deviation of the daily changes in the values 
of the currencies against the USD. As my sample consists of only 9 different currencies, my 
currency volatility factor is more local than global. 
 
D.2 Currency Skewness Factor 
For the currency skewness factor I take inspiration from Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), 
Burnside (2011), as well as Farhi et. al. (2013). The common avenue is that there is a strong link 
between currency carry trade and currency crash risk. Farhi et. al. (2013) find that the disaster risk 
accounts for more than one third of currency risk premia in the advanced economies. The tenet is 
that the carry trades are risky because the high forward premium currencies are often all exposed to 
market crashes (Burnside, 2011). Burnside (2011) computes the skewness measure by sorting the 
currencies into two groups, one with positive and one with negative forward premiums, and 
measures on a monthly basis the realized skewness by taking an average of the realized skewness 
statistic between the two groups.  
 
I derive the currency skewness factor on a currency by currency basis and also on an aggregate 
basis for portfolios HML3 and HML1, using semi-variances in the computation. In other words, I 
calculate the semi-variance on a monthly basis using daily observations. The currency skewness 
factor is defined as 𝑉!  /  𝑉!, where 𝑉! and 𝑉! are subsample measures for the realized dispersion. 𝑉! 
is a sample variance for USD appreciation and 𝑉! is a sample variance for USD depreciation:  
 
𝑟(𝑥)! = 𝑎  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 > 0𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 = 0𝑏  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0                                                                                                                               (12) 
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where r(x)! is the daily change, or a return for a long USD position. As the notation above 
illustrates, a positive change falls into subsample a, while a negative change falls into subsample b. 
If the currency skewness factor equals 1, the two dispersions are equally spread. If the currency 
skewness factor is greater than 1, the dispersion of base currency appreciation is wider. If the 
currency skewness factor is smaller than 1, the dispersion of base currency depreciation is wider. If 
carry currencies are exposed to crashes as mentioned above, the fractions of the HML1, HML3, and 
conventional carry currencies such as AUD and NZD, ought to on average be greater than 1. In 
summary, if the fraction is greater than one, the realized return distribution is negatively skewed.  
 
D.3 Firm-level Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
Burnside (2011) shows that traditional stock market based risk factors do not explain carry trade 
returns. In most cases the issue is that the associated betas are not statistically significant once 
regressed on monthly returns. Burnside’s (2011) conclusion is that a unifying explanation for stock 
market returns and carry returns does not exist. To the contrary, Guo and Savickas (2006) conclude 
that the U.S. idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty predicts changes in the major currencies against 
the U.S. dollar. In other words, there may be grounds for a unifying explanation of stock market 
returns and carry trade returns, given that AHXZ (2006 and 2009) document a relationship between 
the U.S. idiosyncratic uncertainty and stock market returns globally. However, it is important to 
highlight that Guo and Savickas (2006) document that the relationship holds over relatively long 
periods of time: quarterly but more importantly, semi-annually and annually. In other words, they 
fail to investigate the relationship on a monthly basis. Therefore, the explanation for these results 
could be related to the well-known phenomena in econometrics known as the use of unintentional 
proxies, given the findings of CLMX showing that the idiosyncratic volatility covaries with the 
gross domestic product (GDP). In other words, if Guo and Savickas (2006) in their multivariate 
regressions had regressed the quarterly changes in nominal exchange rates using GDP together with 
the firm-level idiosyncratic volatility, the results may have been very different. This problem is 
especially common in time series analysis, where the true explanatory variable is subject to a time 
trend and you substitute, intentionally or otherwise, the true explanatory variable with any other 
variable with the same time trend (Dougherty, 2011). If so, the compensation of the firm-level 
idiosyncratic volatility may have been overestimated. One way to alleviate this problem is to 
shorten the interval. For example, a common way is to utilize the monthly data in order to introduce 
more randomness.  
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On another note, Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009) document that currency crashes are 
positively correlated with implied stock market volatility (VIX). As a measure the idiosyncratic 
volatility is very similar to VIX in the sense that both measure a form of uncertainty. I am interested 
in the predictive power of the idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty with respect to the currency 
crashes. However, I note that the fundamental difference between VIX and the idiosyncratic firm-
level volatility is that one measures the expected non-diversifiable future uncertainty and the other 
quantifies the realized diversifiable uncertainty. 
 
I apply the volatility decomposition framework introduced by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu 
(2001) to decompose a return, in excess of the risk-free rate of a typical stock, into its three 
components: the market-wide return, an industry-specific residual, and a firm-specific residual. In 
other words, I break down the volatility into its simpler constituents. Based on this return 
decomposition, I construct a time-series of the firm level average volatility similar to that done by 
CLMX. I prefer the CLMX approach over the Fama-French framework for its convenience since 
the CLMX framework is by definition covariance and beta free when aggregated over industries. I 
denote industries as 𝑖 and individual firms within a given industry 𝑖 by 𝑗. In other words, a given 
industry 𝑖 has a collection of objects 𝑗. In order to keep my logic intact, the excess return of a 
typical stock 𝑗 that belongs to an industry 𝑖 in the period 𝑡 is denoted as 𝑅!"#. 𝑊!"# stands for the 
weight of the firm 𝑗 within the industry 𝑖 at the time 𝑡. The weighting is based on the current market 
values formed by taking the average of the current period. Average industry excess return of a 
random industry 𝑖 in the period 𝑡 is given by 𝑅!" = 𝛴!"#   𝑤!"#  𝑅!"#. I aggrete the industries and denote 
the weight of an industry 𝑖 with respect to the total market by 𝑤!".  
 
I do not reproduce the CLMX methodology in this paper but instead focus on the practicality of the 
framework (see CLMX for a more elaborated discussion). Following the CLMX, I calculate the 
daily firm-specific residual by subtracting the daily industry i mean return: 
 𝜀!"#$ =   𝑅!"#$ − 𝑅!"#                                                                                                                                          (13) 
 𝑅!"#$ is the return on day s in month t of stock j that belongs to industry i, and 𝑅!"# is the average 
return of industry i on day s in month t. Next, I sum the daily residuals to obtain a monthly 
idiosyncratic volatility (IV) for stock j: 
 
	  	   27	  
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐼𝑉!"# =    𝜀!"#$!  !  !  !                                                                                                                                       (14) 
 
I calculate the value-weighted average of idiosyncratic firm level volatility for each industry j using 
monthly idiosyncratic volatility estimates of firms that belong to industry j. To obtain weights I 
calculate the average market capitalizations during the month t. Furthermore, I use Fama and 
French’s SIC classification procedure to form 49 industry portfolios. Specifically: 
 𝐼𝑁𝐷  𝐼𝑉!" =    𝑤!"#  𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐼𝑉!"#  !  !  !                                                                                                         (15) 
 
where 𝑤!"# is the month t weight of stock j that belongs to industry i. Finally, I add up the monthly 
idiosyncratic volatility estimates across all industries to obtain the value-weighted average of 
monthly idiosyncratic volatility: 
 
𝐼𝑉! =    𝑤!"𝐼𝑁𝐷  𝐼𝑉!"!"!!!                                                                                                                       (16) 
 
where 𝑤!" is the month t  weight of industry i.  
 
D.4 Banking Sector Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model in which traders provide liquidity, but their 
ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009) 
show that a sudden unwinding of carry trades leads to currency crashes and is caused by funding 
constraints. Specifically, increases in the TED spread, which is the 3-month USD LIBOR minus the 
3-month T-Bill yield, is shown to have a positive correlation with currency crashes. Now, because 
carry trades are risky variants on future spot rate, currency crashes will deteriorate carry returns as 
well. Therefore, in the concluding remarks the authors proclaim that new macroeconomic models 
are needed to take into account the fact that the risk premia is affected by both market liquidity and 
funding liquidity.  
 
Filipe and Suominen (2013) answer the call and derive a funding risk metric by using the implied 
stock market volatility and crash risk in Japan. They chose Japan because the JPY has been the 
main funding currency, owing to the lost decade of deflation. Interestingly, the authors’ model is 
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able to explain 42% of the variation in the monthly excess returns. The volatility measure deployed 
in Filipe and Suominen’s model (2013) is the option implied volatility for the entire Japanese stock 
market instead of the financial sector alone, due to insufficient data.  
 
In order to capture the idiosyncratic information within the banking sector, I propose an alternative 
metric using the daily stock market data to calculate a measure for the average firm-level 
uncertainty within the banking sector. This measure is not affected by averaging across bias as 
potentially reflected in Filipe and Suominen’s research (2013). This is an important remark as 
reflected in CLMX, where the authors show that the properties of industry-level volatility vary 
considerably among industries. Additionally, the proposed measure is based in this paper is based 
upon realized rather than implied volatility, a potential caveat. However, the focus is not on the 
debate of whether realized volatility is a better estimate for the unforeseeable uncertainty in short 
horizons, but rather the source of uncertainty. In other words, I concentrate on the fact that there is 
very little reason to believe that the industry and market volatility measures behave in the same way 
unless a certain industry, due to its scale, is effectively the whole market. In order to study the 
idiosyncratic risk in the banking sector, I amend the return composition as I am no longer averaging 
over firms and industries. Therefore, I need a composition that includes the banking sector beta: 
 𝑅!"# = 𝛽!"   𝑅!"# + 𝜀!"#                                                                                                                                          (17) 
 𝑅!"#$ = 𝛽!"   𝑅!"# + 𝜀!"# + 𝜀!"#$                                                                                                                                          (18) 
 𝜀!"#$   = 𝑅!"#$ − 𝛽!"   𝑅!"# − 𝜀!"#                                                                                                                                        (19) 
 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿  𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐸  𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿!"# =    𝜀!"#$!  !  !  !                                                                                                                                       (20) 
 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌!" =    𝑤!"#  𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿  𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐸  𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿!"#  !  !  !                 (21) 
 
Equations 11 and 12 show the decomposition of excess returns, including a beta for each industry 
(CLMX). Equation 13 computes daily firm-specific residuals, while 14 sums daily residuals to 
obtain monthly firm-level volatility for stock j. What is evident in the notation above is that I only 
need one additional parameter to derive the average firm-level idiosyncratic uncertainty metric. In 
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other words, 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌!" only contains information about the average firm-level 
uncertainty within the industry in question as opposed to the average firm-level volatility across all 
industries.  
 
As a consequence, the firm-level idiosyncratic risk factor measures the average firm-level 
uncertainty, whilst the banking sector idiosyncratic risk factor measures the average firm-level 
uncertainty within the banking sector. I use the latter as a proxy for the funding risk in order to 
explain currency excess returns and currency crashes. 
 
D.5 Downside Idiosyncratic Risk Factors 
Motivated by Dodrynskaya (2013), I define the downside adjusted idiosyncratic firm-level risk 
factors. Dodrynskaya (2013) concludes that carry trade crashes occur systematically in the worst 
states of the world. If these return and risk characteristics are predominant in different currency 
blocks, Dodrynskaya’s (2013) sample consists of 42 countries while my sample contains 10 
countries, I would expect to find that the downside idiosyncratic market factors better fit the excess 
return data.  
 
The computation of the downside adjusted idiosyncratic risk factors is rather straightforward as they 
measure the magnitude of directional average firm-level uncertainty. Therefore, in (7) and (13) the 
sample of 𝑅!"#$ only contains negative observations. Other than that, the methods in C.3 and C.4 are 
similar. 
 
E. Research questions 
 
The research questions are motivated by the observed, empirical regularities in the behavior of 
foreign exchange markets. My first objective is to confirm the validity and soundness of my data as 
well as to test the classic topic of international finance, the uncovered interest parity (UIP), which is 
a critical building block of most theoretical models of modern finance.  The second objective is to 
assess if floating exchange rates are affected by learning and potentially reassure that UIP is no 
longer such a dismal empirical failure. My third and fourth objectives revolve around the time-
varying characteristics of the risk premia in foreign exchange. I examine whether the risk-based 
explanatory factors, each introduced in section C, explain the risk-return profile of the different 
carry trade permutations. More specifically, I focus on whether the time-varying exchange risk 
premia relates to the funding constrains. 
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E.1 Testing the Forward Premium Puzzle 
The first hypothesis is well-known and appears frequently in previous literature, seminally in Fama 
(1984). The hypothesis relates to the forward premium bias, also known as the forward premium 
puzzle. My intention is straightforward in assessing a potential bias of future spot estimate in 
today’s forward exchange rate. In other words, I test the forward premium bias and determine if 
expectations among market participants are rational. The null hypothesis is that 𝛽 = 1 and that 𝛼 = 0. If the expectations are rational and investors are risk neutral, I would expect to find that the 
realized depreciation (appreciation) of FCU is equal to the forward premium (discount), plus a 
purely random error term with zero mean as in Froot and Thaler (1990) and Engel (1995). The 
hypothesis tests the bias by regressing the realized change in the spot exchange rate on the 
contemporaneous forward premium:  
 𝑆!!!  𝑠!   =   𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑓!!!  𝑠!   − 1 + 𝜂!!! ,                                                                                                      (22) 
 
where 𝑆!    is the spot price of domestic currency at time 𝑡,     𝑆𝑡+𝑘    is the spot price of domestic currency at 𝑡 + 𝑘, 𝑓!   is the one period forward exchange rate at time 𝑡 for delivery at time 𝑡 + 𝑘, 𝜂! is the 
regression error, and 𝑘    alone is the tenor which equals 1-month forward. 
 
H0: Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) does hold and violations average out resulting in zero 
excess returns. 
 
H1: Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) does not hold and violations result in non-zero excess 
returns. 
 
 
E.2 Testing the Properties of Exchange Rates as Predictors of Future Spot Rates 
The second hypothesis is inspired by the findings of Eugene F. Fama (1984) showing that the 
properties of forward exchange rates as predictors of future spot rates are no different in 
chronological subsample comparison. As Fama (1984) pointed out, investors are not in the process 
of learning about floating exchange rates and henceforth, the forward predictions are not affected by 
learning. In other words, the market’s assessment of ∆𝑆!!!    in 𝐹!!!     /  𝑆!     is consistently perverse vis-
à-vis the realized change in the spot exchange rate. Fama (1984) concludes that inefficiency is 
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persistent in time and that forecasting bias is not cured by continued experience with flexible 
exchange rates.  
 
This occurrence is perplexing and could be settled in more recent time series study, because today, 
twenty-years after Fama’s study, floating exchange rates and managed floating rates are the norm. 
Suppose that market participants have accumulated considerably more experience via similarity and 
associative learning with flexible exchange rate regimes since 1980s. If true, the forward exchange 
rate ought to show increased efficiency in predicting future spot exchange rate. I measure the fit of 𝐹!!!     /  𝑆!    in predicting ∆𝑆!!!    over three non-overlapping subperiods in order to determine if 
learning plays a role. NBER recessions drive a wedge between these respective periods because 
people have a tendency to learn from failure as it generally causes them to pay more general 
attention to basic rules and counterfactual analysis. 
 
H0: The forward exchange rates subsume increased ability to predict future spot exchange 
rates. 
 
H1: The forward exchange rates do not subsume increased ability to predict future spot 
exchange rates. 
 
E.3 Testing the Time-varying Conditional Skewness 
As discussed in the literature review, Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009) report a strong 
linkage between currency carry trades and currency crash risk. The authors provide evidence of 
unfavourably skewed returns emerging from a standard carry trade strategy. Similarly, Eaton and 
Turnovsky (1983) conclude that factors encouraging speculation, such as an increase in the number 
of speculators and an increase in the amount of speculative capital, are likely to reduce the overall 
risk aversion and increase the exchange rate volatility. 
More recently, Poti and Siddique (2013) conclude in their final remarks that the risk capital 
availability predicts the time-varying excess predictability, which is consistent with recent theories 
on limited risk capital mobility (Duffie and Strulovici, 2012). In conclusion it seems that the 
currency carry crashes are driven by the availability of funding and accumulation of speculative 
positions. 
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I am interested in the time-varying characteristics of the conditional skewness and its covariance 
with the average forward premium. I expect higher average forward premiums to absorb more 
speculative capital and result in greater currency skewness factors. 
 
H0: Carry currencies are associated with negative return skewness which varies with and is 
driven by the attractiveness of the standard carry trade. 
 
H1: Carry currencies are not associated with negative return skewness. 
 
E.4 Testing the New Funding Risk Proxies 
Inspired by Felipe and Suominen (2013), I examine the relationship between carry excess returns 
and average banking sector firm-level uncertainty as well as carry excess returns and average firm-
level uncertainty across all industries. The firm-level uncertainty surfaces from the U.S. economy, 
and I define the banking sector using the Fama and French’s SIC classification procedure. As 
mentioned earlier, Adrian and Shin (2002) conclude that aggregate banking sector liquidity can be 
seen as a rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries, and therefore, 
changes in financial institutions equity prices affect ability to lend. Consequently, the banking 
sector idiosyncratic firm-level risk factor may contain unique information relating to current 
funding conditions. On the other hand, the average firm-level uncertainty across all industries ought 
to proxy the average uncertainty within the U.S. economy, which might tame bank’s appetite and 
reduce liquidity. Generally speaking, the banking sector and across-all-industries idiosyncratic 
factors may be considered endogenous and exogenous funding proxies, respectively. 
 
My objective is to test whether these two new explanatory variables contain information that is not 
present in the conventional explanatory variables, such as the TED spread and VIX. I also examine 
whether there is a relationship between the two and the currency skewness factor. I extend existing 
research and investigate the contribution of these new funding proxies, and their specifications, on 
the forward premium puzzle. 
 
H0: The proposed new risk factors contain new information about the carry returns and 
currency skewness factors 
 
H1: The proposed new risk factors do not contain new information about the carry returns 
and currency skewness factors as it is already present in existing explanatory variables 
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F. Empirical Findings 
 
F.1 Forward premium puzzle and different carry permutations 
The starting point of my analysis is the traditional, well-documented currency carry trade. I 
scrutinize the performance of the three slightly different carry permutations. I intend to reinforce 
past research, showing that future change is generally unrelated to forward premium. Additionally, I 
want to confirm the validity and soundness of my data as previously stated.  
 
Before embarking on a journey into the rather perplex world of foreign exchange, I restate the 
underpinning assumptions of UIP. Mainly, UIP hypothesizes that interest rate differentials and 
subsequent spot returns have an inverse relationship such as currencies with positive interest rate 
differentials ought to depreciate, and vice versa. If true in practice, different carry permutations 
should not deviate from UIP, on average. To the contrary, if UIP does not hold, a potential gain 
from a carry position is a function of two interest rates and equals the forward rate for the period, 
while a realized gain is a risky variant of change in spot exchange rate in the interim. If realized 
gains are persistent in time, a rational conclusion is that the foreign exchange markets are risk-
averse or rational expectations are false. If we assume rational expectations, we must attempt to 
attribute the forward rate bias to a foreign exchange risk premium and subsequently risk-neutrality 
would be rejected. If we reject rational expectations, possible explanations for forward rate bias 
include peso problems, learning, as well as speculative bubbles and group-think, which are not the 
topics of focus in this paper. 
 
I report excess returns (RX), spot returns (RS), and average forward premium (AFP) for each carry 
strategy. The three competing carry strategies are the standard carry (figure I top), normalized 
carry (figure I middle) and forward carry (figure I bottom). Each strategy in figure I executes the 
traditional High-Minus-Low (HML3) strategy utilizing time t information to rank currencies based 
on alternative permutations for a chosen tenor, and subsequently investing in currencies with the 
highest forward premium, whilst funding via currencies with the lowest forward premium. 
Generally speaking these portfolios are zero cost at inception and USD neutral. I rebalance the 
portfolios on a monthly basis.  
 
The dotted grey line in figure I depicts the cumulative average forward premium. By looking at the 
plotted time series, it seems that AFP exhibit a high degree of serial correlation whilst the average 
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spot change is likely to follow a random walk. In order to confirm my presumption, I calculate 
autocorrelations with three different lag lengths, i = ( 1, 2, 3). I note that the results are assertive 
enough to conclude that there is a strong dependence between the output variable and its own 
previous values in the case of AFP, but not so much in RS, which is in line with the empirical 
regularities of Mussa (1979).2 The solid red line shows the average spot return, showing signs of a 
random process with no serial dependence. UIP effectively stipulates that the dotted line, the 
average forward premium, and the solid red line, the spot change, should always be superimposed, 
assuming an unbiased estimate of future change. If this were true, the cumulative excess returns, the 
solid blue line, ought to form a straight horizontal line with a zero slope coefficient for in the time 
series. 
 
In other words, the ballistic-like non-zero cumulative excess returns among different carry strategy 
permutations refute the equilibrium state hypothesized by UIP. Therefore, it seems sensible that the 
previous research defines the expected future change as the sum of the expected change and risk 
premium, such as in Fama (1984) and Jensen (1990). At this point, figure I gives the impression 
that the idea of risk neutrality, the mail principle of UIP, should be abandoned. However, in order to 
avoid hasty generalizations and reaching conclusions based on insufficient evidence, I am going to 
turn my attention to the summary statistics in table I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  results	  are	  available	  by	  request	  with	  the	  author.	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Figure I: High-minus-Low 3 Portfolios Deploying Different Carry Strategies 
	  
	  
	  
Figure I plots three different HML3 strategies, each deploying different carry permutations. HML3 portfolios comprise a 
long position in top three currencies and short position in bottom three currencies. The dotted line is the cumulative 
forward premium collected from the long and short positions formed at time t. The solid red line depicts the cumulative 
average spot return of the long-short portfolio. The solid blue line depicts the cumulative excess returns that under UIP 
should effectively be zero. Excess Return is the differential between the expected appreciation and the realized spot 
change. The areas highlighted in yellow reflect the NBER recession cycles. 
 
I report aggregate carry trade statistics in annualized form in table I for HML1, HML3, S1, S2, and 
S3 portfolios across different carry permutations. The aggregated results confirm the existence of 
positive, non-zero excess returns across different HML1 and HML3 portfolios. As table I indicates, 
over the historical sample, the HML3 carry trade strategy, depending on the permutation, had an 
average annual excess return in the range of 2.37% - 2.55%, with a standard deviation ranging from 
3.93% to 4.08% and a Sharpe ratio of 0.59 – 0.65. HML1 permutations yield in two instances 
higher returns than their respective HML3 strategies: standard carry 2.60% against 2.55%, 
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normalized carry 2.48% against 2.55%, and normalized carry 3.25% against 2.37%; HML1 and 
HML3, respectively. HML1 portfolios have significantly greater standard deviations due to the lack 
of diversification, and therefore, it is not surprising that the HML3 portfolios produce superior 
Sharpe ratios, while HML1 over performs on an absolute basis. I argued earlier that if the basis of 
the forward premiums works to produce portfolios with different expected returns, then the ordering 
of the expected returns ought to align with an observed characteristic. If I take a closer look at the 
average forward premiums and average excess returns for HML1 and HML3 within different 
permutations, I can conclude that in two out of three instances the observed characteristics are 
aligned with the expected returns. The only exception is forward carry, where the HML3 portfolio 
yields greater average excess returns than the HML1 portfolio. 
 
In summary, I conclude that HML3 and HML1 performances are anonymously driven by the fact 
that the realized spot change is on average less than the implied change at time t for the subsequent 
period t, t+1. In 4 out of 6 instances the average spot change is actually negative. These consistent 
prediction errors require a rational explanation in order to save the forward rate from a dismal 
failure in predicting future level of foreign exchange. One attempt is to attribute the forward rate 
bias to a foreign exchange risk premium or alternatively refute rational expectations. On the 
contrary, it is important to bear in mind that the forward rate only takes into account information 
that is available at inception, and therefore, any new information that emerges in the interim must 
have been unexpected at the time the forward rate was established. As a result, it is intuitive to 
expect that only a small portion of the realized change is actually attributable to the expected 
change due to the continuous arrival of information. 
 
Long portfolios S1, S2, and S3 properties are aligned with HML3 and HML1. However, there are a 
few interesting points to highlight. First of all, the excess returns and forward premiums are 
monotonously increasing between S3 and S1, which precisely shows that the basis of the forward 
premium is aligned with the observed outcome. Secondly, the excess return volatility increases 
monotonically with the average forward premium. Finally, the average spot return is always 
negative regardless of the forward premium. 
 
The risk-adjusted properties conclude that the forward carry permutation’s HML3 portfolio yields 
the greatest risk-adjusted average performance. This is contrary to my expectation that the 
normalized carry strategy would have returned superior risk-adjusted returns because the other two 
strategies do not penalize for the realized spot exchange rate volatility.  
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In summary, return and risk go hand in hand, and free lunches, average positive excess returns, are 
not actually free. Given the properties of different long and long-sort portfolios, it is intuitive to 
conclude that forward rates are induced by risk premia. 
 
Furthermore, I see a need to modify the Sharpe ratio that penalizes equally both upside and 
downside volatility, by differentiating between negative and positive volatility, as investors have a 
tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. In other words, I calculate a semi-deviation, 
capturing the positive observations that are fundamental as any long and long-sort portfolio is 
effectively a risky variant on future base currency appreciation. Expressed differently, any USD 
appreciation erodes the potential gains at maturity and therefore, a carry investor is taking chances 
on the directional future volatility. Once I normalize the returns with the modified measure, I report 
less attractive HML3 and HML1 portfolios in a risk-return spectrum across different permutations. 
For instance, the standard carry HML3 and HML1 portfolios have the Sharpe ratios of 0.63 and 
0.38 whilst the Sortino ratios are 0.57 and 0.31, respectively. This sort of ratio is known as the 
Sortino ratio as opposed to Sharpe ratio. 
 
Here I use a non-parametric one sample Wilcoxon signed rank test 3 to determine if there is 
evidence showing that HML3 performance among different permutations is statistically different to 
zero. The rationale for a zero hypothesized value emerges from UIP. In the standard carry example 
with 218 degrees of freedom, the corresponding significance is less than 1%. As a result, I conclude 
that the average performance of standard carry strategy is not only economically, but also 
statistically different to zero. Similarly, the average returns from the forward carry and the 
normalized carry are statistically different to zero. In conclusion, I have shown that different carry 
permutations yield economically and statistically different positive average performance in time 
series, which refutes UIP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  My results until now show violations of normality.	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Table I: Monthly Carry Trade Return Summary Statistics 
      Standard Carry     
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 2.55% 2.60% -0.84% 0.90% 4.26% 
Standard Deviation 4.08% 6.77% 8.12% 8.89% 10.55% 
Semi-Deviation 4.50% 8.46% 7.50% 9.04% 10.55% 
Skewness * -0.92 -1.35 0.32 -0.25 -0.44 
Kurtosis * 2.98 4.66 -0.17 1.66 2.44 
Sharpe Ratio 0.63 0.38 -0.10 0.10 0.40 
Sortino Ratio 0.57 0.31 -0.11 0.10 0.40 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Mean -0.45% 0.60% -1.08% -0.86% -1.98% 
Standard Deviation 4.09% 6.79% 8.07% 8.84% 10.49% 
Semi-Deviation 3.58% 5.24% 9.05% 8.68% 10.31% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 2.10% 3.19% -1.93% 0.04% 2.28% 
Standard Deviation 0.14% 0.25% 0.48% 0.37% 0.38% 
      Forward Carry     
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 2.55% 2.48% -0.93% 1.08% 4.17% 
Standard Deviation 3.93% 6.73% 8.29% 8.72% 10.46% 
Semi-Deviation 4.37% 8.35% 7.68% 8.90% 10.46% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.65 0.37 -0.11 0.12 0.40 
Sortino Ratio 0.58 0.30 -0.12 0.12 0.40 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Mean -0.45% 0.71% -0.99% -1.04% -1.89% 
Standard Deviation 3.94% 6.74% 8.23% 8.67% 10.41% 
Semi-Deviation 3.41% 5.18% 9.21% 8.47% 10.23% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 2.10% 3.18% -1.92% 0.04% 2.28% 
Standard Deviation 0.14% 0.25% 0.47% 0.37% 0.38% 
      Normalized Carry     
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 2.37% 3.23% -0.89% 1.37% 3.84% 
Standard Deviation 4.01% 6.62% 8.20% 8.93% 10.39% 
Semi-Deviation 4.45% 7.31% 7.65% 8.89% 10.36% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.59 0.49 -0.11 0.15 0.37 
Sortino Ratio 0.53 0.44 -0.12 0.15 0.37 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Mean -0.29% -0.21% -1.01% -1.32% -1.59% 
Standard Deviation 4.02% 6.63% 8.15% 8.88% 10.33% 
Semi-Deviation 3.58% 5.77% 9.10% 8.91% 10.08% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 2.07% 3.03% -1.90% 0.05% 2.25% 
Standard Deviation 0.14% 0.25% 0.47% 0.38% 0.37% 
      
* Results show similar tendency amongst the other carry permutations  
   
 
Table I reports the annualized summary statistics for standard carry, normalized carry, and forward carry. High-Minus-
Low portfolios, e.g. HML3, consist of a long position in the top three and a short position in the bottom three currencies. 
I also report the statistics for long sub-portfolios. For instance SI comprises the top three currencies and S3 contains the 
bottom three currencies. I utilize end-of-month data (EOM) from January 1996 to February 2014. Exchange rates are 
from Reuters. All the portfolios are rebalanced on a monthly-basis. 
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Similarly, I compare competing permutations to assess whether their absolute excess return 
averages differ from zero. In other words, I test the hypothesis that two distributions are the same, 
that is, standard carry equals to forward carry. If the distributions are the same in statistical terms, 
the choice of the permutation is irrelevant as they contain the same information about the expected 
returns. As expected, standard carry and forward carry strategies are effectively the same and the 
results are similar to normalized carry strategy. In conclusion, in terms of out-of-the-sample excess 
return predictability, there is no difference among the three permutations. 
 
Third and fourth moments, skewness and kurtosis, of the long and long-sort portfolios for the 
standard carry strategy confirm the findings of currency crash literature, by showing that a higher 
average forward premium is accompanied with greater negative return skewness and greater 
directional volatility. 
 
F.2 Subperiod results and Effects of Learning 
Previously, I have highlighted the ballistic shape of excess returns in figure I. In other words, it 
seems that the excess returns emerging from the different carry permutations deteriorate over time. I 
take this as a pre-evidence, suggesting that the excess returns are not constant but rather time-
varying or alternatively subject to learning.  
 
In order to conduct a more detailed analysis on this matter, I construct three sequential non-
overlapping time series to study the performance of the standard carry strategy. The choice of carry 
strategy is trivial because the correlations among across different strategies are close to 1 as seen in 
table II. 
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Table II: Correlation Coefficients amongst Different Carry Strategies 
      
        
  Excess Return: (Ft / St+1 - 1) 
  Standard Carry Normalized Carry Forward Carry 
Standard Carry 1.00   
 
Normalized Carry 0.98 1.00 
 
Forward Carry 0.99 0.97 1.00 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St - 1)   
  Standard Carry Normalized Carry Forward Carry 
Standard Carry 1.00   
 
Normalized Carry 0.97 1.00 
 
Forward Carry 0.99 0.97 1.00 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St - 1)   
  Standard Carry Normalized Carry Forward Carry 
Standard Carry 1.00   
 
Normalized Carry 0.99 1.00 
 
Forward Carry 0.99 0.98 1.00 
 
Table II reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients between different carry permutations. Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
are defined as the covariance of the two variables in question divided by the respective product of their standard 
deviations. 
 
The first panel in figure II (Panel I) consists of the end-of-month data from January 1996 to April 
2001, the second panel (Panel II) goes from November 2001 to December 2007, and the final panel 
(Panel III) starts June 2009 and ends February 2014. I set the timing of the entry, as well as the exit 
point, not to coincide with the U.S. business cycle contractions as reported by the NBER4. The 
rationale to exclude the periods of NBER contractions relates to the occurrence of crash risk during 
the worst states of the world as reported in Dodrynskaya (2013) and depicted in figure I. In other 
words, I want to study the effects of learning during the “normal times”. Moreover, NBER 
recessions drive a wedge between periods, and should therefore, be valuable if learning plays a role. 
This is because people tend to learn from failure as they typically ought to pay more attention to 
basic rules and counterfactual analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  US	  Business	  Cycle	  Expansions	  and	  Contractions	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Figure II: High-minus-Low 3 Standard Carry Subperiod Comparison 
 
 
 
Figure II illustrates the subperiod excess returns and its elements for the HML3 standard carry portfolios.  
 
I summarize the subperiod results in table III and confirm that the traditional carry strategy is not 
suffering from fading profitability, but rather time-varying excess returns. The average excess 
return variation is evident in the long portfolios: portfolio S1 excess returns range from -4.08% to 
12.05%. The results of S1 in panel I demonstrate that carry investing is a double-edged sword. In 
other words, following an aggressive strategy can be one’s rise or downfall. More specifically, the 
subperiod results highlight the importance of diversification in carry investing, and therefore, it is 
not surprising that HML3 yields the most consistent performance. Generally speaking, the observed 
variation in excess returns is most likely related to the variation in risk premia as explained in Fama 
(1984). Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) suggest that factors encouraging speculation, and more 
importantly the amount of speculative capital, are likely to reduce overall risk aversion and increase 
exchange rate volatility. In summary, it seems that risk-taking is greatly encouraged in certain time 
periods and that without fault very high returns go to those who take the greatest risk. 
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Table III: Monthly Carry Trade Return Panel Data Summary Statistics 
 
  Panel I - January 1996 / April 2001 
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 2.33% 0.96% -8.73% -5.88% -4.08% 
Standard Deviation 4.04% 6.82% 8.16% 7.08% 6.91% 
Semi-Deviation 4.61% 9.13% 8.01% 7.40% 7.02% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.58 0.14 -1.07 -0.83 -0.59 
Sortino Ratio 0.50 0.10 -1.09 -0.79 -0.58 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Average 0.07% 2.81% 4.92% 4.83% 5.07% 
Standard Deviation 4.04% 6.82% 8.19% 7.07% 6.85% 
Semi-Deviation 3.29% 4.63% 10.39% 7.19% 6.78% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 2.40% 3.77% -3.81% -1.05% 0.99% 
Standard Deviation 0.09% 0.17% 0.14% 0.15% 0.27% 
  Panel II - November 2001 / December 2007 
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 4.12% 7.26% 3.81% 8.34% 12.05% 
Standard Deviation 3.20% 5.52% 7.46% 7.80% 8.44% 
Semi-Deviation 3.04% 6.26% 6.43% 6.26% 7.30% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.29 1.31 0.51 1.07 1.43 
Sortino Ratio 1.35 1.16 0.59 1.33 1.65 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Average -1.78% -3.81% -5.67% -8.12% -9.23% 
Standard Deviation 3.20% 5.52% 7.42% 7.74% 8.38% 
Semi-Deviation 3.14% 5.21% 8.46% 8.82% 9.40% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 2.34% 3.45% -1.87% 0.22% 2.82% 
Standard Deviation 0.06% 0.13% 0.43% 0.47% 0.38% 
  Panel III - June 2009 / February 2014 
 
HmL3 HmL1 S3 S2 S1 
 
    Excess Return: (Ft / St+1) -1     
Average 2.05% 2.13% 2.47% 1.70% 6.56% 
Standard Deviation 3.89% 5.22% 7.82% 8.69% 12.21% 
Semi-Deviation 3.67% 5.15% 7.29% 9.18% 12.78% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.53 0.41 0.32 0.20 0.54 
Sortino Ratio 0.56 0.41 0.34 0.18 0.51 
 
    Spot Change:  (St+1 / St) -1     
Average -0.59% -3.81% -2.75% -1.08% -3.92% 
Standard Deviation 3.88% 5.52% 7.82% 8.69% 12.19% 
Semi-Deviation 3.90% 5.21% 8.28% 8.28% 11.44% 
 
    Forward Premium: (Ft / St) -1     
Average 1.46% 2.09% -0.27% 0.62% 2.64% 
Standard Deviation 0.07% 0.14% 0.05% 0.11% 0.13% 
 
Table III represents the annualized summary statistics of the standard carry permutation for the subperiods. The sample 
period for panels I, II, and III is Jan-96 – Apr-01, Nov-01 – Dec-07, and Jun-09 – Feb-14, respectively. Data is end-of-
month data (EOM). Exchange rates are from Reuters. I use information at time t to determine the rankings and report 
the returns for the period of t, t+1. All portfolios are rebalanced on a monthly-basis. 
 
Inspired by Fama (1984) I now re-examine the role of learning in foreign exchange. In other words, 
I examine if past excess returns were partly induced by the market participants’ overestimation of 
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the frequency as well as the magnitude of the reported sudden reversals. If so, the argument 
supporting the willingness to take on the ‘same’ risk with less compensation is plausible. My 
hypothesis is that the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) has become a more efficient predictor of 
future spot rate, and that this increased efficient can be attributed to learning. On a currency by 
currency basis, I compute the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for each subperiod and 
compare the goodness-of-fit measures, by regressing the realized spot change on forward premium. 
A progressively higher R-squared measure would imply that the accumulated experience with 
flexible exchange rates has alleviated the forecasting bias, and consequently, today’s estimate is 
more robust. 
 
The statistical inferences of the results partly confirm my thoughts. The impression is that 
predictability increases as I move from panel I towards panel III, but since the R-squared measures 
on average remain extremely low and none of the coefficients are statistically significant, I 
conclude that learning does not play a role. Expressed differently, I report that the goodness-of-fit 
measures on average improve over time, but since the proposed model on average is not 
statistically significant, the forward premium does not show an increased ability to explain 
subsequent change in spot rates, at least not in statistical terms. Furthermore, of the full sample of 
coefficients, 9 are negative, which concludes that the proposed and theoretically-sound inverse 
relationship between the forward premium and the subsequent spot change does not hold in 
practice. In consonance, with the huge amount of literature on the forward premium puzzle and the 
bias hypothesis, I conclude that the coefficient is reliably less than one. My average coefficient for 
the full sample is -1.60. 
 
Additionally, even when I split the full sample into subperiod results in order to alleviate the 
problem of non-constant variance during the full sample period, there is no evidence of a robust 
relationship between today’s forward premium and a subsequent change in spot rate. Moreover, the 
subsample III results are extremely counter-intuitive owing to the harmony of subsamples I and II. 
The average coefficient across the 9 currency pairs in the subsample III is 6.92. This implies, for 
example, that when the interest rate differential increases by 1 percentage point, the base currency 
subsequently tends to appreciate at an annual rate of almost 7 percent.  
 
In summary, I have so far concluded that the UIP does not hold and excess returns are time-varying. 
If I continue assuming that rational expectations hold, the only way to save the UIP from dismal 
failure is to attribute excess returns to different risk factors. 
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Table IV: OLS Regressions Testing Conditional Forward Premium Bias a 
 
  Full Sample Sub-Samples I, II, and III 
 
January 96 - February 14 January 96 - April 01 November 01 - December 07 June 09 - February 14 
AUD -2.06 -5.89 -0.17 -4.51 
 
(0.007) (0.0231) (0.0000) (0.0074) 
CAD -1.89 -2.04 0.05 6.22 
 
(0.004) (0.0093) (0.0000) (0.0059) 
CHF -2.77 1.54 -2.35 -23.94 
 
(0.014) (0.0008) (0.0099) (0.0168) 
EUR -3.33 -3.20 -2.25 8.23 
 
(0.015) (0.0049) (0.0142) (0.0062) 
GBP -1.11 -0.85 0.42 28.44 
 
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0128) 
JPY -0.24 -1.67 -1.61 15.75 
 
(0.000) (0.0005) (0.0087) (0.0062) 
NOK -0.93 -2.20 -1.17 13.65 
 
(0.003) (0.0154) (0.0080) (0.0121) 
NZD -0.13 -0.65 -1.71 16.53 
 
(0.000) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0060) 
SEK -1.92 -1.40 -1.90 1.92 
 
(0.007) (0.0041) (0.0131) (0.0012) 
a Estimate of Beta (goodness of fit)       
Beta coefficient =  St+1 - St = i + a(Ft - St) + e2 
   
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
   
Table IV represents the annualized summary statistics for beta coefficients and goodness-of-fit measures (in 
parenthesis). The sample period for panels I, II, and III is January 1996 – April 2001, November 2001 – December 
2007, and June 2009 – February 2014, respectively.  
 
F.3 Linkage between Currency Carry Trades and Currency Crash Risk. 
In addition to the properties of the time-varying average carry strategy profitability, I am interested 
in the presence of non-normality in foreign exchange and its relationship with the average forward 
premium. As previously stated, the carry excess returns tend to suffer from negative conditional 
skewness. I calculate monthly variance ratios (currency skewness factors) on the back of daily spot 
returns. If the bandwagon effect is prevalent, on average across the full sample, currencies with 
higher average forward premiums should have greater variance ratios, an evidence supporting the 
existence of crash risk. If so, the underlying positioning is likely to be clustered and homogenous, 
fueling speculative bubbles. For example, if greater forward premiums on average attract more 
speculative money, the clustered positioning may create momentum to the adverse spot movements, 
amplifying speculator losses. 
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The results suggest that the variance ratio, which is a conditional positive variance divided by a 
conditional negative variance, varies over time. Remember that investors overall prefer avoiding 
losses to acquiring gains, and therefore, a positive variance is less desirable. If a positive variance is 
greater than a negative variance, the explanation is that the base currency appreciation has been 
more prevalent during the sample period. After all, a carry investor hopes the base currency to 
depreciate, or alternative appreciate, but only to a certain extent, in order to enjoy positive returns 
over the period. 
 
In table V, variance ratios and average forward premiums provide interesting evidence during 
normal periods (outside the NBER recessions cycles), supporting existing literature on crash risk. 
Variance ratio, which is effectively an average realized risk premia, exhibits rather high variability 
in time series and across currencies. For example, take AUD, GBP, NOK, and NZD. For each of 
these currencies, the average forward premium is positive throughout the sample accompanied with 
the realized VR ratios that are greater than 1. To the contrary, the same metrics for HML1 and 
HML3, which isolate the U.S. funding bias potentially present in the results, confirm that the carry 
strategies as well suffer from negative return skewness.  
 
In conclusion, my results are consistent with the fact that carry trades are exposed to crash risk 
during normal times. My results suggest that the failure of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) may 
potentially relate to the compensation that investors require for providing liquidity. 
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Table V: Variance Ratios and Average Forward Premiums 
 
  Full sample 
Panel I - January 1996 / 
April 2001 
Panel II - November 2001 / 
December 2007 
Panel III - June 2009 / 
February 2014 
  
Variance Ratio 
(VR) * 
Average Forward Premium 
(AFP) ** VR AFP VR AFP VR AFP 
Currency skewness measures on a currency by currency basis 
AUD 1.408 2.12% 1.563 0.03% 1.275 2.50% 1.300 3.70% 
CAD 1.223 -0.04% 1.163 -1.02% 1.016 0.18% 1.361 0.62% 
CHF 1.264 -2.01% 1.322 -3.92% 0.985 -1.99% 1.565 -0.45% 
EUR 1.271 -0.46% 1.310 -1.68% 1.039 -0.19% 1.516 0.03% 
GBP 1.221 0.91% 1.242 0.62% 1.101 1.55% 1.317 0.24% 
JPY 1.447 -2.97% 1.163 -5.49% 1.211 -2.98% 2.091 -0.31% 
NOK 1.332 0.98% 1.457 -0.20% 1.111 0.82% 1.544 1.59% 
NZD 1.321 2.69% 1.268 1.27% 1.338 3.61% 1.153 2.57% 
SEK 1.277 -0.08% 1.239 -1.33% 1.066 -0.09% 1.444 0.94% 
         Currency skewness measures for long-short portfolios 
HML3 1.349 2.55% 1.323 2.33% 1.445 4.12% 1.288 2.05% 
HML1 1.375 2.60% 1.341 0.96% 1.497 7.26% 1.223 2.13% 
                  
 
Table V represents the annualized summary statistics for variance ratios and average forward premiums. The sample 
period for panels I, II, and III is January 1996 – April 2001, November 2001 – December 2007, and June 2009 – 
February 2014, respectively. Variance ratio is calculated from daily spot return data. 
 
 
F.4 Excess Returns and Different Sources of Risk Premia 
I begin by computing traditional Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the excess returns from 
different portfolios deploying the standard carry ranking methodology and unique risk factors. I 
also analyze average currency skewness metrics for all 9 currencies, and separately for HML1 and 
HML3 portfolios. Pearson’s correlation coefficients are defined as the covariance of the two 
variables in question, divided by the respective product of their standard deviations. Intuition 
suggests that negative loadings on the explanatory variable should emerge when the variables are 
defined over the same period, i.e. the causal channel goes through contemporaneous changes rather 
than lagged changes. To the contrary, I expect positive loadings on the respective risk factors 
against the average skewness metrics. 
 
Looking at table VI, I can confirm that this thinking makes sense. In HML1 and HML3 columns of 
table VI a negative correlation coefficient emerges between implied volatility, idiosyncratic 
volatility, downside adjusted idiosyncratic volatility, TED spread, banking sector idiosyncratic 
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volatility, downside adjusted banking sector idiosyncratic volatility, banking sector idiosyncratic 
surprise, and realized currency basket volatility (VOL).  
 
For long portfolios S1, S2, and S3 the results are similar except that implied volatility has a positive 
correlation with the excess returns which seems counter-intuitive. A possible explanation may relate 
to the fact that the implied volatility measures future uncertainty. In other words, a 
contemporaneous measure for implied volatility is most likely misspecified as there is no time 
between the cause and effect.  
 
Additionally, both downside adjusted measures have greater correlation coefficients, suggesting 
that the direction is more important than the dispersion per se. However, the surprise measure, 
banking sector idiosyncratic surprise, produces the greatest correlation coefficients among the 
different banking sector idiosyncratic uncertainty measures. In summary, the unexpected directional 
adverse specification has the highest relative correlation coefficient with the carry trade excess 
returns. 
 
To the contrary, the currency skewness factors have a positive correlation coefficient with different 
risk metrics. A sturdy explanation, similar to existing crash literature, is that investors are more 
likely to unwind their carry positions amid increasing uncertainty. In other words, if investors 
simultaneously unwind positioning in the same currency, the supply-and-demand dynamics would 
cause further damage to existing positions. Since the correlation coefficients are very close to zero, 
there is a possibility the contemporaneous relationship is misspecified. Also, the correlation 
coefficient of the implied volatility holds an opposite sign with respect to the rest of the pack and is 
possibly related to the pre-emptive reduction in liquidity: speculators discount a higher probability 
for future crash; liquidity drops in FCU before the event because people avoid any excessive 
exposure in the given currency; and the base currency depreciates. 
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Table VI: Portfolio Excess Returns and Risk Factors 
Predictor Variables Correlation with the Dependent Measure 
	  
HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 SKW SKWHML1 SKWHML3 
Implied Volatility -0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.14 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.20 -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Downside Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.20 -0.17 -0.23 -0.21 -0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 
TED -0.39 -0.33 -0.27 -0.19 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.12 
Banking sector idiosyncratic volatility -0.26 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.03 
Banking sector downside idiosyncratic volatility -0.28 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.02 
Banking sector idiosyncratic surprise -0.28 -0.34 -0.36 -0.36 -0.13 0.09 0.08 0.14 
VOL -0.39 -0.31 -0.17 -0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.05 
                  
Implied Volatility is the VIX index and measures the subjective probability distribution of future uncertainty 
Idiosyncratic Volatility measures the average idiosyncratic firm-level shocks across different industries 
Banking sector idiosyncratic volatility measures the average idiosyncratic firm-level shocks within the banking sector 
TED spread measures the availability of liquidity, which is the 3-month USD LIBOR minues 3-month T-Bill yield 
DOL measures the average excess return across portfolios S3, S2, and S1 
Banking sector idiosyncratic surprise equals banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty divided by period t-1 implied volatility 
 
Table VI represents the correlation coefficients between the dependent measures (portfolio returns) and independent 
variables (sources of uncertainty). The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2013. 
 
Table VII: Risk Factor Correlation Matrix 
  
	  
Implied 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
Downside 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
TED 
Banking 
sector 
idiosyncratic 
volatility 
Banking 
sector 
downside 
idiosyncratic 
volatility 
Banking sector 
idiosyncratic 
surprise 
VOL 
Implied Volatility 1.00 0.53 0.51 0.43 0.69 0.67 0.15 0.42 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility  1.00 0.99 0.46 0.71 0.71 0.53 0.36 
Downside 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility   
1.00 0.45 0.70 0.71 0.55 0.35 
TED 
   
1.00 0.67 0.67 0.56 0.50 
Banking sector 
idiosyncratic 
volatility     
1.00 0.99 0.69 0.49 
Banking sector 
downside 
idiosyncratic 
volatility 
     
1.00 0.73 0.49 
Banking sector 
idiosyncratic 
surprise       
1.00 0.32 
VOL 
       
1.00 
                  
 
Table VII represents the correlation matrix for different independent variables (risk factors). The sample period is from 
January 1996 to December 2013. 
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My next question explores to what extent the information embedded in the different risk factors is 
unique. One way to address this question is to construct a correlation matrix for the independent 
variables. If the correlation coefficient is close to +1, the conclusion would be that the two risk 
factors contain the exact same information and I may omit one of them. 
 
First, I note that none of the correlation coefficients are anyway near one, which means that I may 
not omit any of the risk factors without risking a possibility of marginal contribution.  
 
Furthermore, I am interested in the correlation coefficients between the banking sector idiosyncratic 
firm-level uncertainty and the TED spread as well as the idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty and 
the implied volatility.  
 
Looking at the latter first, it is important to remember that the fundamental difference between the 
implied volatility and the idiosyncratic uncertainty is that the implied volatility measures non-
diversifiable uncertainty, while the idiosyncratic uncertainty quantifies the diversifiable uncertainty. 
Also, the implied volatility reflects the expectation of future uncertainty, whereas the idiosyncratic 
volatility measures the realization of past uncertainty. As seen in table VII, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.53 for the latter pair. Therefore, if changes in the idiosyncratic uncertainty explain 
changes in the carry excess returns, part of the excess return variability may be attributed to the 
average firm-level shocks, resulting in a potentially statistically significant marginal contribution to 
the explanatory power of the model. For the downside adjusted idiosyncratic uncertainty the 
correlation is 0.51 and the remarks on the subject are the same. 
 
By the same token, the TED spread and the banking sector idiosyncratic uncertainty are both related 
to existing literature on funding constraints. As already mentioned, the TED spread is a measure of 
liquidity constraints in the economy. Generally speaking, increases in the TED spread are related to 
reduced risk tolerance. The banking sector idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty measures the firm-
level volatility in the banking sector and can be linked to funding constraints, credit risk, and 
systemic risk. In summary, both risk factors are related to the same underlying uncertainty, 
speculators’ willingness and ability to keep or put capital at risk. Since the correlation coefficient 
with the TED spread is 0.67, which is high but clearly less than one, I suggest that the banking 
sector average firm-level volatility may contain information that is related to excess return 
variability, but is not present in the TED spread. For the downside adjusted idiosyncratic banking 
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sector volatility the correlation is 0.67 and for the banking sector idiosyncratic surprise the 
correlation is 0.56.  
 
In conclusion, it is worth conducting regression analysis to measure the degree of relationship 
among the idiosyncratic volatility and banking sector idiosyncratic volatility in time series vis-à-vis 
the excess returns, given that both risk factors have similar characteristics, but are not the same, to 
the implied volatility (VIX) and the TED spread, respectively. 
 
Table VIII: Mutually Exclusive Single Explanatory Variable Regression Models 
 
	  
Average Implied Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
Downside 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
TED 
Banking sector 
idiosyncratic 
volatility 
Banking sector 
downside 
idiosyncratic 
volatility 
Banking 
sector 
idiosyncratic 
surprise 
VOL 
Excess returns and risk factors               
HML1 2.60% -0.03* -0.036*** -0.053*** -1.891*** -0.038*** -0.059*** -0.016*** -0.238*** 
r2 
 
{0.015} {0.039} {0.040} {0.155} {0.070} {0.080} {0.076} {0.154} 
HML3 2.55% -0.003 -0.015** -0.027** -0.96*** -0.017*** -0.029*** -0.012*** -0.114*** 
r2 
 
{0.000} {0.018} {0.028} {0.110} {0.040} {0.054} {0.114} {0.096} 
S1 -0.58% 0.018 -0.057*** -0.096*** -1.982*** -0.043*** -0.076*** -0.032*** -0.164** 
r2 
 
{0.002} {0.040} {0.055} {0.070} {0.037} {0.055} {0.128} {0.030} 
S2 -0.77% 0.01 -0.042*** -0.072*** -1.17*** -0.037*** -0.063*** -0.028*** -0.042 
r2 
 
{0.001} {0.031} {0.044} {0.035} {0.038} {0.054} {0.133} {0.003} 
S3 1.51% 0.023 -0.027 -0.043* -0.061 -0.009 -0.017 -0.009* 0.063 
r2 
 
{0.006} {0.015} {0.019} {0.000} {0.002} {0.005} {0.016} {0.008} 
          
Currency skewness measures and risk factors             
SKW 1.16 0.318 0.073 0.115 3.373 0.199 0.309 0.096 -0.066 
r2 
 
{0.005} {0.000} {0.001} {0.001} {0.006} {0.006} {0.008} {0.000} 
SKWHML1 1.25 -0.437 0.107 0.174 13.056* 0.025 0.051 0.11 0.642 
r2 
 
{0.006} {0.001} {0.001} {0.013} {0.000} {0.000} {0.007} {0.002} 
SKWHML3 1.19 -0.483 -0.006 0.038 7.795* -0.053 -0.061 0.115** 0.384 
r2 
 
{0.020} {0.000} {0.000} {0.013} {0.001} {0.000} {0.020} {0.002} 
                    
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	   	   	   	   
Table VIII holds the single regression model summary statistics. Beta coefficients are expressed with the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%. R-squared metrics are expressed in parenthesis. The sample period is from January 1996 to 
December 2013. 
 
Using the excess returns and risk factors section in table VIII, I conclude that the statistical 
inferences of the single linear regressions on excess returns are intriguing. Firstly, with respect to 
the implied volatility and the idiosyncratic volatility, the results of the latter are more often 
statistically significant with varying degrees of significance, whilst the former only reaches the 
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required threshold once. In other words, on average, the null hypothesis is true and I conclude that 
the observed relationship between the contemporaneous implied volatility (VIX) and the excess 
returns is likely related to sampling error (a random chance), or alternatively, to misspecification (a 
contemporaneous measure versus a lagged measure). To the contrary, the contemporaneous 
measure for the idiosyncratic volatility is more likely to reflect the actual characteristics of the 
underlying excess returns since the beta coefficients are statistically significant for HML1, HML3, 
S1, and S2. Therefore, I refute the null hypothesis and conclude that the results are not a by-product 
of randomness. Furthermore, when I look at the goodness-of-fit measure, r2, the idiosyncratic 
volatility better explains the variability of excess returns in all five instances (HML1, HML3, S1, 
S2, and S3). I propose an out-of-the-box explanation linked to CLMX, which I leave open for future 
research, where a possible explanation may be related to the fact that arbitrageurs, who trade to 
exploit the mispricing of individual stocks rather than aim to hold well-diversified portfolios, are 
more exposed to the idiosyncratic return volatility, and not the aggregate market volatility, due to 
the lack of diversification. If so, during times of increased firm-level uncertainty, a unifying 
explanation for stock market returns and carry returns may be present. For instance, it is possible 
that the portfolio manager’s choices for liquidation are limited to the most marketable holdings such 
as foreign exchange carry trades.  
 
Secondly, the banking sector volatility and the TED spread are both likely to match the 
characteristics of the underlying excess returns via the funding constraints linkage. The funding 
constraints linkage relates to tightness of margin constraints, or an increase in funding risk, and 
should be associated with poor carry trade returns as explained in Filipe and Suominen (2013). In 
general, I report that the coefficients are significant with normal levels of significance, while the 
TED spread over performs in terms of goodness-of-fit in three out of five regressions. However, 
with respect to the correlation matrix in table VI, it is very likely that the banking sector volatility 
contains unique information, which is not captured by the TED spread, and therefore, may provide 
existing multivariate models on the excess return variability with a statistically significant marginal 
contribution. Moreover, I argue that the banking sector uncertainty is potentially associated with 
causality through the changes in financial institutions equity prices, where the change in the 
variable results in the contemporaneous change with respect to their ability to lend to other market 
participants such as speculative accounts. This causality is not necessarily present in the TED 
spread. 
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Thirdly, the basket realized volatility, VOL, explains the excess returns with varying success with 
respect to both long-short and long strategies. VOL performs particularly well in explaining the 
HML1 and HML3 portfolio excess returns, which makes sense given that the volatility is the only 
caveat of foreign exchange carry strategies. 
 
Moreover, I find that the risk premia is monotonically increasing in the level of the average interest 
rate differential across the board. In other words, the high average interest rate differential 
portfolios such as HML1 and S1 have relative greater beta coefficients with respect to the different 
risk factors. Also, the downside adjusted measures of idiosyncratic uncertainty have superior 
explanatory power leading to a conclusion that the downside adjusted measures similar to 
Dodrynskaya (2013) better fit the excess return data. 
 
Next I briefly turn my attention to the bottom section, currency skewness measures and risk factors, 
of table VII. SKW is the average skewness of the 9 currencies, and SKWHML1 as well as 
SKWHML3 relate to the High-Minus-Low strategies, which have USD neutral funding. My 
interpretation of the results is that in most cases, excluding a few exceptions, there is no linkage 
between the different risk factors and the currency skewness metrics: the TED spread holds 
statistically significant betas for SKWHML1 and SKWHML3 but the explanatory power remains 
very low, while the banking sector idiosyncratic surprise measure explains SKWHML3. Since the 
explanatory power is close to zero, there is a possibility the contemporaneous relationship is 
misspecified and time should be allow between cause and effect. 
 
E.5 Multivariate Funding Risk Analysis 
In section E.4 I restricted my analysis to simple regression models, implicitly assuming that the 
dependent variable was related to one explanatory variable. In general, the excess returns are most 
likely attributable to several, perhaps many, explanatory variables. For this reason, I scrutinize the 
joint explanatory power among the different funding parameters: the TED spread and the banking 
sector downside adjusted firm-level uncertainty. I start off with a model of two explanatory 
variables. I presume that the excess returns are influenced by a contemporaneous change in the 
funding uncertainty and a moving average of funding uncertainty. 
 
A contemporaneous funding uncertainty relates to short-run implications, such as unexpected 
shocks to the entire financial system. These shocks may cause speculators to deduce from this 
simple observation that a systemic risk event is more feasible. For example, a sudden increase in the 
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average banking sector firm-level uncertainty disseminates a message to speculative accounts that 
there is an increased likelihood of systemic risk, such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
encouraging pre-emptive reduction in positioning. Expressed differently, the losses that emanate 
from a financial sector alone increase the likelihood of severe instability or collapse of an entire 
industry, resulting in deleveraging, where speculators unwind their existing positions. In other 
words, changes in financial institutions equity prices directly affect their ability to lend to other 
market participants (Adrian and Shin, 2010). Similarly, Duffic and Strulovici (2012) consider that 
unexpected changes in the amount of capital available to speculators result in severe adjustment in 
risk premia. My assessment is that the practical repercussions are similar to the funding spirals 
introduced in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). A funding spiral per se instigates speculators to 
unwind, resulting in further losses. Explained differently, I consider the short-run effects are 
destabilizing during the current period. 
 
To the contrary, I presume that the moving average of funding uncertainty relates to the long-run 
effects such as the availability of liquidity. In other words, the causality between the dependent 
variable and the moving average of the independent variable is most likely related to factors 
regulating the amount of speculative capital as compared to the short-run effects. In other words, an 
increase in the average firm-level uncertainty in the banking sector is likely to reduce banks’ 
appetite to extend credit to speculative accounts. Similarly to Duffie and Strulovici (2012), I 
presume that an abundance of capital results in low risk premium. Therefore, if a credit extension 
becomes and more importantly remains binding, a straightforward implication is to discourage 
speculation and consequently, increase the overall risk aversion, which in turn would lead to a 
higher risk premium. In other words, a higher risk premium translates into greater excess returns 
given the relationship between expected and observed return characteristics discussed earlier in this 
paper. Intuitively, if most of the speculators are providing liquidity at the same time, the 
compensation for proving liquidity must be less on a relative scale as compared to a situation where 
liquidity is scarce. 
 
The relationship between the excess returns from various standard carry portfolios and the different 
funding proxies is: 
 𝑟𝑥 𝑦 ! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝑇𝐸𝐷! + 𝛽!  𝑇𝐸𝐷  6𝑀  𝑀𝐴! + 𝑢!                                                                                                            (12) 
 𝑟𝑥 𝑦 ! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾! + 𝛽!  𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾  6𝑀  𝑀𝐴! + 𝑢! ,                                                                                                      (13) 
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where rx is the excess return for period t whereas 𝑦 =    𝐻𝑀𝐿1,𝐻𝑀𝐿3, 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3 , TED and BANK 
are the contemporaneous measures for the funding uncertainty in period t, and TED 6M MA and 
BANK 6M MA relate to the 6-month moving average measures.  
 
The results of the multiple regression results depicted in tables IX-A and IX-B confirm my 
thoughts. In other words, the 6-month moving average measures have statistically significant 
positive betas while the contemporaneous measure coefficients have statistically significant 
negative betas. The results confirm that the two funding proxies have similar characteristics, when 
putting the differences in explanatory fit aside. Moreover, the topline of the results in tables IX-A 
and IX-B are that the TED model better explains the excess returns for portfolios HML1 and 
HML3, whereas the banking sector downside adjusted model does a better job of explaining excess 
returns in the long portfolio S1, S2, and S3. Since U.S. dollar is not a traditional funding currency, I 
suggest that the banking sector funding proxy ought to be computed using the stock market data 
from Switzerland or Japan since the currencies of these two countries are considered the traditional 
funding. Moreover, it is worth to mention that the bottom currency, when I perform the rankings 
with the standard carry methodology, is in each and every case either CHF or JPY, which means 
that the HML portfolios are never funded via U.S. On the same token, McGuire and von Peter 
(2009) conclude that a stress on banks’ balance sheets can cause shortage on funding in a given 
currency and therefore, a strong relationship between the U.S. funded carry portfolios and the U.S. 
idiosyncratic banking sector uncertainty seems plausible. However, I leave this question 
unanswered and subject to future research to address. 
 
I also consider various specifications for the explanatory variables in question such as lagged 
values, lognormal transformation, and percentage changes, but conclude that the contemporaneous 
and 6-month moving average specifications best fit the data. However, the problem with the 
contemporaneous or instantaneous relationship is that it is possible that the dependent variable and 
the independent variables are both correlated with a third, unknown variable. Therefore, I should 
allow for the possibility that time might elapse between the cause and effect. For the avoidance of 
doubt, I confirm that the one-period lagged measure of the contemporaneous parameter remains 
statistically significant for both funding proxies.5 Nevertheless, in my opinion it is reasonable to 
assume that foreign exchange markets rapidly incorporate new information, implying that if the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  r2 measures	  for	  the	  lagged	  banking	  sector	  downside	  firm-­‐level	  uncertainty	  for	  portfolios	  HML1,	  HML3,	  S1,	  S2,	  and	  S3	  are	  0.0600,	  0.0502,	  0.0374,	  0.0323,	  and	  0.0007,	  respectively.	  All	  coefficients	  excluding	  S3	  are	  statistically	  significant	  with	  1	  percent	  significance	  level.	  The	  results	  for	  the	  TED	  spread	  show	  a	  similar	  trend,	  i.e.	  there	  is	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  goodness-­‐of-­‐fit	  measure	  from	  table	  VIII.	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banking sector uncertainty unexpectedly deteriorates during the current period, the price action take 
place instantaneously. In other words, because funding problems in future are now more probable, 
a pre-emptive risk-off motivated reduction in positioning is likely to ensue during the same period 
and lead to the loss spirals. In summary, I argue that the most likely causal channel goes through 
contemporaneous changes rather than lagged changes. My remarks are open to debate. 
 
Table IX-A: Funding Model I  
 
Variables HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 
Banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty -0.1143*** -0.0859*** -0.206*** -0.1451*** -0.0342 
Std. Err. (0.0249) (0.0146) (0.0385) (0.0330) (0.0313) 
6-month MA banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty 0.0763*** 0.0777*** 0.1788*** 0.1128*** 0.0234 
Std. Err. (0.0287) (0.0168) (0.0442) (0.0379) (0.0360) 
	  
	   	   	   	   	  
r2 0.1104 0.1431 0.1235 0.0921 0.0069 
Model F 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.0006*** 0.4881 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
Table IX-B: Funding Model II 
Funding Model II on excess returns 
Variables HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 
TED spread -2.8781*** -1.9864*** -3.516*** -1.772** 0.4561 
Std. Err. (0.5340) (0.3203) (0.8728) (0.7548) (0.6978) 
6-month MA TED spread  1.3822** 1.439*** 2.146** 0.837 -0.7334 
Std. Err. (0.6115) (0.3666) (0.9994) (0.8643) (0.7990) 
	   	   	   	   	   	  r2 0.1743 0.1709 0.0898 0.0390 0.0042 
Model F 0*** 0*** 0.0001*** 0.016** 0.6461 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	   	   	   	   
Tables IX-A and IX-B represent the funding models I and II. I am not running a horse race comparison but rather show 
that the observed characteristics of both models are very similar, while the TED model better fits the data. The sample 
period is from January 1996 to December 2013. 
 
I now extend my earlier model to allow for the possibility that excess returns are simultaneously 
influenced by the banking sector idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty and the TED spread. 
However, because my explanatory variables are correlated and conceptually similar, issues related 
to the multicollinearity may pose a problem. I simply test whether multicollinearity is a problem by 
running a regression with all the four variables in question. As expected, it turns out that the t-
statistics for the coefficients are not always significant, although regression on the HML3 portfolio 
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excess returns is an exception, yet the overall F-statistics are significant. These results together with 
relatively high pairwise correlations in table VII are indicators that the multicollinearity is 
potentially a problem. One way to deal with correlated independent explanatory variables is to 
orthogonalize them. Therefore, I use the residual values as an orthogonalized additional explanatory 
variable: 
 𝑇𝐸𝐷 =   𝛽! + 𝛽!  𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾! + 𝑢! ,                                                                                                                      (14) 
 
where 𝑢! captures the unique information that is not present in BANK. I compute (14) by regressing 
BANK on TED as well in order to capture the capture the unique information that is not present in 
TED. 
 
I report the results from this extension in tables X-A and X-B. I have two tables because BANK fits 
the S1, S2, and S3 data better than TED, whereas TED better explains HML1 and HML3 as seen in 
IX-A and IX-B. In other words, I have one funding model for the long portfolios that are funded in 
the USD, and another for the USD neutral long-short portfolios. However, my intention is not to 
run a horse race in order to conclude which one of the funding proxies is superior, but rather to 
understand if information content is complementary at any level. 
 
I start off with the long portfolios in table X-A. The first observation is that I have produced a 
satisfactory model for the long portfolios in which all explanatory variables are significant.6 More 
importantly, the orthogonalized residuals are statistically significant and multicollinearity is no 
longer a threat. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude yet that the marginal explanatory power, an 
improvement in the model fit, is any better because even if the new variable truly belongs in the 
model, its correlation with the other model variables may be high, and therefore, the marginal 
explanatory power is low, or in some cases, statistically insignificant. 
 
I report that the joint marginal contribution of the new orthogonalized variable is not significant 
once I take into account the loss in degrees of freedom. In other words, the improvement in fit from 
IX-A S1 to X-A S1 is the reduction in the residual sum of squares, 0.17497 - 0.17186, and the cost 
equals one degree of freedom because I have estimated an additional parameter. The number of 
degrees of freedom remaining after adding the new variable is 208 – 1 = 207. Therefore, 𝐹 1,207 =
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  long	  portfolio	  S3	  anymore	  but	  document	  the	  results	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  consistency.	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   !.!"#$"!!.!"!#$ /!!.!"!#$/  !"# = 3.75 and because F(1,207) must be higher than F(1,250), which is 3.88 at the 5 
percent level, I cannot refute 𝐻! and conclude that the residual variable capturing the unique 
information content in TED does have significant joint explanatory power, i.e. the improvement in 
model fit is not statistically significant. In conclusion, a more complex model for the excess returns 
of the long USD funded carry portfolios is not statistically any better in terms of goodness-of-fit, 
which means that the unique information content in the TED spread is not complementary at normal 
levels of statistical significance. 
 
In summary, the explanatory power of the long portfolio model in X-A, F, is slightly greater when 
compared to IX-A, which means that the inclusion of the additional parameter has increased the 
goodness of fit, but as already mentioned, the marginal contribution to the explanatory power is not 
statistically significant. However, Dougherty (p. 173, 2011) notes that if a parameter in question has 
a significant coefficient, it is likely to belong to the model, and dropping it could distort the results 
by giving rise to the omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, the downside adjusted banking sector 
idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty specifications covary with the carry trade excess returns. 
  
 
 
Table X-A: Funding Model III 
 
Variables HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 
Banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty -0.1078*** -0.0827*** -0.2012*** -0.1442*** -0.0357 
Std. Err. (0.0240) (0.0143) (0.0383) (0.0331) (0.0314) 
6-month MA banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty 0.0674** 0.0734*** 0.1722*** 0.1115*** 0.0254 
Std. Err. (0.0277) (0.0165) (0.0441) (0.0381) (0.0361) 
Residuals from regressing TED on banking sector downside firm-
level uncertainty -1.682*** -0.8152*** -1.2544* -0.2355* 0.3761 
Std. Err. (0.4065) (0.2418) (0.6477) (0.5595) (0.5311) 
	   	   	   	   	   	  r2 0.1783 0.1877 0.1391 0.0929 0.0093 
Model F 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.0002*** 0.5864 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	   	   	   	   
Table X-A represents the funding model I that utilizes the unique information in TED. The sample period is from January 
1996 to December 2013. 
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I now turn my attention to the long-short portfolios in table X-B. In brief, all explanatory variables 
are significant and multicollinearity is no longer a threat. To begin with, I assess the marginal 
contribution. First, the improvement in fit from IX-B HML3 to X-B HML3 is the reduction in the 
residual sum of squares, 0.02446 - 0.02375, and the cost is again one degrees of freedom. The 
number of degrees of freedom remaining after adding the new variable is 208 – 1 = 207. Therefore, 𝐹 1,207 =    !.!"##$!!.!"#$% /!!.!"#$%/  !"# = 6.19, and because F(1,207) must be lower than F(1,250), which is 
3.88 at the 5 percent level, I refute 𝐻! and conclude that the residual variable capturing the unique 
information content in the banking sector downside adjusted firm-level uncertainty does have 
significant joint explanatory power, i.e. the improvement in the model fit is statistically significant. 
To the contrary, for HML1 the results are the exact opposite. Nevertheless, I argue that while the 
model itself is already highly significant before the inclusion of the new funding parameter, the 
unique information content captured by the banking sector downside adjusted firm-level uncertainty 
increases the explanatory power of the model. Therefore, I have statistically significant evidence of 
the complementary fit with respect to the TED spread and the banking sector downside adjusted 
firm-level uncertainty. 
 
Table X-B: Funding Model IV 
Funding Model IV on excess returns 
Variables HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 
TED spread -3.2839*** -2.3321*** -4.4707*** -2.7407*** 0.1935 
Std. Err. (0.5805) (0.3455) (0.9413) (0.8094) (0.7627) 
TED spread 6-month MA 1.9472*** 1.921*** 3.474*** 2.1846** -0.3678 
Std. Err. (0.6899) (0.4106) (1.1188) (0.9620) (0.9064) 
Residuals from regressing Banking sector 
downside idiosyncratic volatility on TED -0.0343* -0.0292** -0.0806** -0.0817*** -0.0222 
Std. Err. (0.0200) (0.0117) (0.0319) (0.0274) (0.0259) 
	  
	   	   	   	   	  
r2 0.1861 0.1949 0.1169 0.0783 0.0077 
Model F 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.0007*** 0.6583 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	   	   
Table X-B represents the funding model II that utilizes the unique information in banking sector firm-level uncertainty. 
The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2013. 
 
Finally, I include the orthogonalized residuals from the moving average measure as well and report 
the results for the funding model V in table XI, concluding that the marginal contribution in the 
model fit from adding two new parameters is statistically significant for HML3. The critical value 
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of F is  𝐹 2,206 =    !.!"##$%!!.!"#$%& /!!.!"#$%&/  !"# = 6.19 and because the critical value of F(2,206) must be 
smaller than F(2,200), which is 4.71 at the 1 percent level, I refute 𝐻! and conclude that the 
contribution from both residual parameters is statistically significant at 1 percent level.  The 
contribution of the explanatory power as regards to HML1 is not significant at the normal levels of 
significance, while the respective results for S1 and S2 are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
Table XI: Funding Model V 
Funding Model V on excess returns 
Variables HML1 HML3 S1 S2 S3 
TED spread -3.3005*** -2.3534*** -4.537*** -2.7848*** 0.1697 
Std. Err. (0.5806) (0.3423) (0.9290) (0.8040) (0.7625) 
6-month MA TED spread  2.068*** 2.0754*** 3.9554*** 2.5041*** -0.1953 
Std. Err. (0.6996) (0.4124) (1.1195) (0.9688) (0.9187) 
Residuals from regressing banking sector downside firm-level 
uncertainty on TED -0.0541** -0.0545*** -0.1595*** -0.1341*** -0.0504 
Std. Err. (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0439) (0.0380) (0.0361) 
Residuals from regressing  6m MA banking sector downside firm-
level uncertainty on 6m MA TED 0.0346 0.0442** 0.1377** 0.0914** 0.0493 
Std. Err. (0.0333) (0.0196) (0.0533) (0.0462) (0.0438) 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	  
r2 0.1904 0.2142 0.1446 0.0955 0.0138 
Model F 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.0004*** 0.5796 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
	   	   	   	   
Table XI represents the funding model II that utilizes the unique information in funding model I. The sample period is 
from January 1996 to December 2013. 
 
In conclusion, the results in this paper offer an interesting addition to existing funding constraints 
literature and a small step to the right direction with respect to solving the forward premium puzzle. 
For future research, I urge people to explore alternative approaches on the realized banking sector 
idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty because to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first 
work that shows the relationship between the banking sector firm-level uncertainty and the carry 
trade excess returns. 
 
F.6 Multi-Dimensional Regression Analysis on Funding Risk 
Finally, I suspect that the carry trade community, in other words speculators whose role is to 
provide liquidity in foreign currency, simply respond, without feedback, to the adverse unexpected 
developments in the financial sector by deleveraging existing positions. If these reactions are 
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collective, a loss spiral is likely to ensue as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Therefore, the 
interactions in the aftermath of the adverse unexpected developments in the financial sector may be 
as follows: the initial unexpected idiosyncratic shock within the banking sector increases market 
illiquidity and leads to speculator losses, speculator positions are reduced collectively without 
feedback, prices drop further, losses on existing positions, speculators encounter funding problems 
due to the deteriorating conditions in the banking sector, forced selling and reduction in speculator 
positions ensue, and so on. 
 
To the contrary, and according to the Triennial Central Bank Survey 2013, global foreign exchange 
market turnover indicates that the daily average trading volumes of outright forward agreements 
trended up to $680 billion in 2013 from $128 billion in 1998, a 431% increase. As mentioned in the 
Triennial survey, the measurement of speculative positioning is subject to inaccuracy, but my 
assessment is that we can safely assume that the turnover by the speculative community has surged 
up as well. 7 In conclusion, today every attractive opportunity is being eyed by many more investors 
than in the past. Additionally, I presume that the importance of the banking sector in asset pricing 
has monotonically increased during recent years of financialization. Financialization relates to 
ever-larger and more-complex financial systems which may be prone to crashes, leading to systemic 
crashes. 
 
Therefore, the relationship between the surge in the amount of speculative capital and 
financialization is of interest. I report the results by regressing the HML3 excess returns on 
different funding proxies in a multi-dimensional setting in table XII. Firstly, I report that all 
coefficients have the same sign and that results are statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. Surprisingly, the banking sector idiosyncratic surprise variable’s explanatory power increases 
monotonically in the multi-dimensional setting, whereas both the TED spread and other 
specifications for the banking sector idiosyncratic variable remain fairly constant.  
 
In conclusion, a possible explanation is that speculative investors have become increasingly 
sensitive to the conditions in the banking sector, indicating that the uncertainty spillovers from the 
financial sector drive asset prices in cross-section. Also, it is evident and obvious in today’s world 
that the financial sector has become more interconnected. Alternatively, pressure to maximize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  average	  daily	  trading	  volumes	  of	  outright	  forwards:	  $128	  billion	  (1998),	  $130	  billion	  (2001),	  $209	  billion	  (2004),	  $362	  billion	  (2007),	  $475	  billion	  (2010),	  $680	  billion	  (2013).	  The	  numbers	  are	  adjusted	  for	  local	  and	  cross-­‐border	  inter-­‐dealer	  double-­‐counting	  (net-­‐net	  basis).	  Source	  Triennial	  Central	  Bank	  Survey	  2013.	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short-term returns may lead to trigger-happy behaviour in foreign exchange, where speculators and 
investors unwind positions before the forward premium is fully absorbed. 
 
 
Table XII: Multi-Dimensional Regression Analysis on Funding Constraints 
Multi-Dimensional Regression Analysis of Time-Series Data on HML3 Excess Returns 
	  
Panel I: 1996 - 2013 Panel II: 2000 - 2013 Panel III: 2005 - 2013 
High-minus-Low 3 (HML3) Excess Returns 
Banking sector idiosyncratic 
surprise -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
r2 {0.114} {0.171} {0.220} 
Banking sector downside 
idiosyncratic volatility -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
r2 {0.054} {0.057} {0.071} 
Banking sector idiosyncratic 
volatility -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
r2 {0.040} {0.038} {0.047} 
TED -0.96*** -0.881*** -0.893*** 
r2 {0.110} {0.117} {0.130} 
    
N 215 155 95 
        
Banking sector surprise equals banking sector downside firm-level uncertainty divided by period t-1 implied volatility 
Banking sector idiosyncratic volatility measures the average idiosyncratic firm-level shocks within the banking sector 
TED spread measures the availability of liquidity, which is the 3-month USD LIBOR minues 3-month T-Bill yield 
N equals the number of end-of-month (EOM) observations in the sample 
 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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G. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, I look at the banking sector idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty emerging from the 
United States as a possible explanation for the non-zero carry trade excess returns. The causality 
between the dependent variable, carry excess returns, and the independent variables, funding 
proxies, is most likely related to factors regulating, endogenously and exogenously, the amount of 
speculative capital.  
 
Expressed differently, an increase in the average firm-level uncertainty in the banking sector is 
likely to reduce a bank’s appetite to extend credit to speculative accounts. Similarly to Duffie and 
Strulovici (2012), I assume that an abundance of capital results in a low risk premium. Therefore, if 
a credit extension becomes, and more importantly remains binding, a straightforward implication is 
to discourage speculation and consequently, increase the overall risk aversion, which in turn would 
lead to a higher risk premium. In other words, a higher risk premium translates into greater excess 
returns given the relationship between expected and observed return characteristics. These are the 
long-run implications of the average banking sector firm-level uncertainty on the carry trade excess 
returns. A short-run implication relates to unexpected shocks that may cause speculators to deduce 
that systemic risk is more probable. For example, a sudden increase in the average banking sector 
firm-level uncertainty disseminates a message to speculative accounts that there is a greater 
likelihood of a systemic shock such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, encouraging a pre-
emptive reduction in positioning and resulting in loss spirals. Stated otherwise, the short-run effects 
are destabilizing during the current period. 
 
The multivariate model constructed in this paper is statistically significant and explains 14.3% of 
the excess return variability of the High-minus-Low (HML3) portfolio that comprises a long 
position in the top three currencies and a short position in the bottom three currencies. The model 
utilizes the information embedded in the realized firm-level idiosyncratic average uncertainty in the 
U.S. financial sector. Moreover, a joint multivariate funding model that combines the information 
of the conventional TED spread and the banking sector idiosyncratic firm-level uncertainty 
emerging from the U.S. explains 21.4% of the High-minus-Low (HML3) excess return variability.  
 
Additionally, a single explanatory variable which proxies the effects of unexpected funding shocks 
explains 11.4% of the High-minus-Low (HML3) excess return variability for the full period from 
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1996 to 2013. By comparison, the contemporaneous TED spread explains 11.0% of the excess 
return variation for the same period. The correlation coefficient among the two is 0.56. Moreover, 
the explanatory power of the banking sector idiosyncratic surprise measure increases from 11.4% to 
22.0% in a multi-dimensional setting. Finally, I introduce an alternative metric for the CBOE VIX 
option implied volatility (VIX). 
 
In summary, I consider the results in this paper to be an interesting addition to existing  literature on  
funding constraints and a small step in the right direction in solving the forward premium puzzle.  
 
In addition to opening new avenues for future research, I confirm existing literature on the 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) violations, the role of learning in the forward premium puzzle, and 
the linkage between currency carry trades and currency crash risk. 
 
In future, I urge further exploration of alternative approaches to the banking sector idiosyncratic 
volatility because to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first piece of research that shows 
the relationship between banking sector firm-level uncertainty and excess returns from foreign 
exchange carry strategies. 
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